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THE ADVANCED SECURITY OPERATIONS CORPORATION  
SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS INITIATIVE:  






The purpose of this MBA Project is to investigate and provide a comprehensive 
overview of the current state of affairs with regard to the privatized security industry. The 
project focuses on a business plan that will cover three phases for a start-up company to 
enter the private security market. The purpose of Advanced Security Operations 
Corporation (ASOC) is to enter and profit from the growing Privatized Military Industry 
(PMI) trend. 
This proposal looks at establishing a network of centralized SWAT teams whose 
sole mission is to train and conduct SWAT operations.  These teams will greatly increase 
the chance of success and minimize casualties, while greatly reducing cost.  ASOC will 
use collaborative efforts with local, state and national law enforcement agencies in order 
to maximize this innovative and value-added plan. 
The goal of government should be to drastically reduce the cost of redundant and 
inefficient services.  By following the trend to outsource services and create a privately 
run and centrally located SWAT Team, the local, state, and federal government can 
create a long term capability that is less expensive, yet has a greater capability for 
mission success.   The costs-benefits and problems/solutions that would face such an 
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A. ASOC SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) INITIATIVE  
Contracting tasks that are not a business core competency is a trend that is 
growing exponentially in business.  The military has pursued this business approach and 
is contracting a myriad of services including logistics and personal protection in combat 
zones.  Governments and cities have begun contracting redundant services that they can 
share with adjacent public entities.1  Numerous studies have concluded that this business 
practice can greatly reduce costs. 
The purpose of Advanced Security Operations Corporation (ASOC) is to enter 
and profit from this growing Privatized Military Industry (PMI) trend.  The niche that 
ASOC is looking to use to enter the market would be to create privatized SWAT Teams 
near large metropolitan areas.  These Teams would meet all the SWAT needs of these 
areas while drastically reducing the cost of supporting independent teams. 
The growing trend in almost every police department before and especially after 
9/11 is to have a SWAT Team of some sort.  Even the United States Coast Guard is 
looking to create its own SWAT Team.2   Most SWAT Teams are made up of police 
officers that work and train part-time for SWAT missions.  Police departments have also 
considered an initiative to start "multi-jurisdictional" SWAT teams to reduce costs.  
However, these teams are still made up of officers from different police departments that 
come together only occasionally to train and are plagued by conflicts over command and 
control.  Various leaders and officials are also concerned that the para-militarization of 
these officers may be sending the wrong message to the public about the direction of law 
enforcement. 
After 9/11, the government entered a new Homeland Security era.  They have 
begun to allocate financial resources to create and support local law enforcement 
including SWAT teams.  A mixed conglomerate of police officers that only do SWAT 




missions and training part time, though, will lead to sub-optimization of these teams.  
This sub-optimization will increase the risk to these officers, hostages and civilians in a 
time of crisis and reduce the chance for success.  Examples of such sub-optimized 
responses can be seen at Columbine High School in the United States and Soviet attempts 
at hostage rescue in recent incidents with Chechen terrorists. 
This proposal looks at establishing a network of centralized, highly specialized, 
SWAT teams in the Southern California area --Los Angeles (LA) in particular-- whose 
sole mission is to train and conduct SWAT operations.  These teams will greatly increase 
the chance of success and minimize casualties while greatly reducing cost.  ASOC will 
use collaborative efforts with local, state and national law enforcement agencies in order 
to maximize this innovative and value-added method of protecting America. 
 
B. SWAT MARKET 
The Department of Homeland Security is allocating grant money to local 
governments for anti-terrorism protection.  The Office for Domestic Preparedness Funds, 
which originate with the Department of Homeland Security, are awarded to and 
distributed through the State Administrative Agency designated by the Governor of each 
state.3  Total funding provided through the Office for Domestic Preparedness Funds 
alone this award cycle is $2.2 billion. California was the largest recipient with a total of 
$176,499,000 divided into $133,964,000 for the state Homeland Security Program and 
$39,752,000 allocated for law enforcement terrorism prevention.4 
The total funding for the Los Angeles SWAT market alone is substantial with a 
potential market of $112,108,439.  Taking into account potential overlap, the initial 
redundant funds for SWAT missions in Los Angeles are $10,800,000.  This redundant 
SWAT market represents immediate business opportunities.   






Another potential market in the SWAT market is coordinating between the 
various SWAT organizations.  The only element of the SWAT market attempting to fill 
this role is the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department SWAT but they do not cover all 
the local police SWAT teams and federal agencies.  The Los Angeles Terrorism Early 
Warning Group attempts to address this need but does not provide real-time, on-call 
coordination for the various SWAT agencies.  Thus, the Los Angeles SWAT market is 
ripe with business opportunities for capable and competent security experts.  
 
C. PHASES FOR MARKET ENTRY 
ASOC intends to segment its growth and development into three phases to enter 
the SWAT market.  In each phase, the company must realistically determine what 
services it is able to provide with the capital assets it can obtain.  
During the implementation phase, or Phase 1, ASOC will act as a security 
consultation and coordination firm. ASOC will provide expert advice in matters 
concerning security operations for local law enforcement agencies.  ASOC will also act 
as a central point of contact for the coordination of command and control operations for 
emergency response. 
Phases 2 and 3 will introduce actual operating teams into the market environment. 
Phase 2 will stand up one team in Los Angeles. Once that team is well established and the 
operating characteristics are evaluated and proven sound, Phase 3 will establish several 
teams to handle the southern half of California and Las Vegas.  Future growth projections 




After determining its potential market, the next step for ASOC is to analyze its 
own strengths and weaknesses and apply these to the numerous outside threats and 
opportunities.  ASOC has many internal strengths and weaknesses.  Its strengths, though,  
4 
outweigh the weaknesses.  These strengths consist of substantial savings in financial 
costs for local and state governments.  They also involve the ability to focus and 
coordinate SWAT activities. 
Though the potential weaknesses in a private SWAT company are plentiful, 
ASOC has a plan to counter the weaknesses during each phase.  During the Phase 1 
consulting focus, ASOC can build the necessary relationships and experience levels to 
counter the Phase 2 and 3 politics, marketing, legal, infrastructure, and financial 
weaknesses. 
The opportunities for a private SWAT company are also numerous and far 
outweigh the threats.  The threats discussed above are real but can be countered with 
aggressive marketing campaigns and in-depth planning.  The pivotal strategy to enter the 
market early will allow ASOC to seize the initiative and counter many of the competition 
threats. 
Just as Phase 1 prepares ASOC to deal with its potential Phase 2 and 3 
weaknesses in its internal strength and weakness analysis, the same concept applies to the 
outside opportunity and threat analysis.  By entering the market as a consulting firm, 
ASOC can learn to seize the opportunities and counter the threats imposed on the SWAT 
operational second and third phases.  By learning the SWAT business and developing key 
relationships with SWAT stakeholders in law enforcement and local and state 
governments, ASOC will have the necessary knowledge to understand the politics and 
financial intricacies before it invests in substantial SWAT operational assets. 
Based upon the SWOT analysis, there is an excellent fit between the emerging 
private SWAT market and all three phases of ASOC’s business strategy. 
 
E. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
Based on the potential market and its own internal capabilities, ASOC must 
examine its forecasted income and cash flow statements.  In this proposal, ASOC 
determined that it would analyze two different financial scenarios to determine if the 
business is financially worth the investment of time and resources.  The first scenario 
5 
involved an optimistic scenario where ASOC had a substantial share of the market as it 
transitions between phases.  The second scenario analyzes a worst-case scenario where 
only one local police department contracts their services and other police departments are 
slow to sign contracts with ASOC.  This worst-case scenario addresses revenue and cash-
flow issues that are pivotal to a business staying in business during the tough beginning 
years. 
Based on the financial analysis, ASOC should be able to make an immediate 
profit in the optimistic scenario.  It will have a tougher time, though, in the worst-case 
scenario and will have to look for alternate sources of income as it transitions between 
phases.  It also will have to be creative in acquiring cash for daily operational expenses 
and aggressively cut costs until cash flow and revenue can cover expenses.  ASOC 
should be able to survive this worst-case scenario and eventually make a profit if business 
is difficult at the beginning of its business. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This business proposal analyzes the potential SWAT market in Los Angeles and 
Southern California.  It also explains the capabilities ASOC can offer and the business 
strategy that ASOC plans to employ.  It conducts a SWOT analysis and a cost-
effectiveness analysis to look closely at what ASOC can offer and what it should concern 
itself with.  Lastly, it analyzes whether ASOC should pursue this private SWAT business 
and whether it can make any money offering services to the public law enforcement 
community and private business community. 
The goal of government should be to drastically reduce the cost of redundant and 
inefficient SWAT services.  The SWAT trends are similar to the problems that face the 
American intelligence community.  By following the trend to outsource services and 
create a privately run and centrally located SWAT Team, the local and federal 
government can create a long term capability that is less expensive, yet has a greater 
capability for mission success.  ASOC can provide this professional, competent, and 
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II. MARKET ANALYSIS 
A. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
The first step in building a business proposal is to determine if a market exists for 
a company.  Before launching a business, the founders need to conduct a market 
opportunity analysis.  A marketing opportunity analysis “determines the attractiveness 
and success probability” of a business opportunity.”5 Since Advanced Security 
Operations Corporation (ASOC) is in its infancy stage, a determination must be made as 
to how much money is available in the SWAT market in the target area.  ASOC has long-
term goals of reaching the Las Vegas / Southern California market but will focus initially 
on Los Angeles. 
The chapter will begin with an overview of the history of SWAT organizations.  
This history will focus on the growth of SWAT since its beginning.  It will define SWAT 
and explain its mission.  The chapter will then analyze potential SWAT markets for 
ASOC focusing on the threat to high-risk transportation and government facilities in Los 
Angeles.  The chapter will then explore how much money is being spent in the Los 
Angeles area on SWAT focused organizations.  It will initially examine local SWAT 
teams and then will shift focus to federal SWAT teams in the Los Angeles area.  
Established budget numbers and educated assumptions will be used to determine the total 
amount of money that government is spending to fund these SWAT organizations.  
Lastly, this chapter will discuss the various grants that the Department of Homeland 
Security is offering to the Los Angeles area.  These costs and grant opportunities should 
provide an approximate value of the various SWAT markets in the Los Angeles area. 
The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the overlapping roles of various 
SWAT organizations.  These overlapping roles will give ASOC an important marketing 
focus as it attempts to enter the government–based SWAT market with a privatized 
company.  These overlapping missions and geographical areas of the numerous SWAT  
                                                 
5 Kotler, Philip. (2003). A Framework for Marketing Management (2nd ed.). New Jersey: Pearson Education. 
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teams in Los Angeles will provide a good starting point to identify potential markets and 
eventually sell ASOC’s services more efficiently and cost-effectively than the current 
local police and federal agency teams. 
 
B. HISTORY OF SWAT 
SWAT is an acronym meaning Special Weapons and Tactics.  Most citizens of 
the United States recognize SWAT as a specialized police unit that supports the general 
line officers in situations that are beyond their capabilities and training.  Members of a 
typical SWAT organization are organized into four-member teams and are trained to 
perform high-risk operations.  The teams are typically equipped with more complex 
equipment, weapons, and vehicles such as secure radios, high-powered rifles, sub-
machine guns, armored vehicles and helicopters. 
The city of Los Angeles, California is the home of the first SWAT unit.  In the 
1960s, the city was faced with new and unusual challenges to law enforcement.  Incidents 
involving the sniping of police officers and the taking of hostages convinced officers in 
the department that a unit of specially trained personnel was required to handle special 
contingencies.  They reasoned that line officers could not handle these unusual 
circumstances effectively due to their limited weapons training, infrequent weapons 
practice and little or no team training.  The team training that the line officers did receive 
was in the form of crowd control or “riot police” training, and that type of training did not 
prepare officers to deal effectively with the new threats.6  
The first SWAT unit was initially comprised of 60 officers divided into 15 four-
man teams.  The officers were required to attend monthly training in special weapons and 
tactics.  As a result of their elevated status as specialized officers, they received 
additional benefits and pay.  The new SWAT unit had the additional duty to protect 
police facilities during “times of civil unrest”. 
 
                                                 
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAT 
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C. SWAT FORMATION 
1. Local Level 
After the Los Angeles founded its first SWAT unit, other metropolitan areas 
began to realize that they faced many of the same problems in law enforcement.  As 
populations rose in urban areas, the incidence of violent crime rose as well. In order to 
combat the new issues raised by the rapid expansion of violent crime, cities and counties 
turned to the Los Angeles SWAT model for rapidly deployed and specialized units to 
overcome these security issues. 
In the early 1970s, New York City founded its Emergency Service Unit7.  The 
Emergency Service Unit is used primarily to coordinate with and support the activities of 
other units within the New York Police Department.  Chicago, Illinois soon followed by 
implementing a Hostage Barricade and Incident Team, that has since been renamed the 
Hostage Barricade and Terrorist Team.8 
Many other cities and counties have also recognized the need for specialized 
support teams that have training above and beyond that of the normal line police officer. 
However, due to the size of their police departments and the infrequent occurrence of the 
types of crimes that require the sort of intervention that a SWAT unit provides, most of 
the departments have formed ad hoc teams that are a collateral duty for regular officers.  
For example, in 1972, the city of Spokane, Washington formed its first SWAT team from 
five regular officers.9  According to the team’s historical website, “…the Team consisted 
of five members, who had their own military fatigues and who’s [sic] arsenal consisted of 
two pump shotguns, a privately owned big game rifle, and the department issued six shot 
revolvers.”10 These officers were not only responsible for their normal duties, but also 
served on the SWAT team in an on-call status.  Many other police and sheriff’s 
departments share responsibilities between the cities and counties that they serve and 
have cross-jurisdictional agreements for support. 






2. Federal Level 
The necessity for specialized response teams is not isolated to local communities. 
In 1982, the United States Department of Justice created a special counterterrorist unit to 
supply support for “…any extraordinary hostage crisis occurring within the United 
States.”11  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was authorized by the Attorney 
General to form what is now called the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). The team became 
active in 1983 and was originally composed of 50 agents. 
The HRT has since grown to more than 90 agents and is a full-time national level 
response team.12  The team is required to deploy within four hours and is composed in 
such a way that it can move out with some, or all of its equipment and personnel 
depending upon the severity of the incident. 
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) also has a team of trained professionals 
whose job entails support of local law enforcement agencies in the fight against drug-
related crime.  Formed in 1995, the DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) was 
created to overcome two important shortfalls that existed in local law enforcement. The 
shortfalls were in equipment and personnel diversification.13  Through standardization of 
equipment and training, the MET teams were able to significantly reduce drug-related 
activities in the communities they supported.  The teams only deploy when requested by 
local law enforcement agencies. 
Other Federal agencies that have some sort of “Tactical Operations Unit” (TOU) 
include, but are not limited to, the U. S. Custom’s Agency, the U. S. Marshall’s Office 
and the U. S. Coast Guard.  In every case, the reason for the formation of a TOU was in 
response to a threat that could not be easily overcome by normal tactics and training.  At 
the federal level, all agencies are supposed to coordinate with each other and also 
coordinate their activities with local law enforcement. 
 





3. The SWAT Mission 
The mission of a SWAT team or TOU consists of many varied sub-missions that 
are all specialized depending on the type or types of threats for which the teams were 
formed. The sub-missions that the teams perform are those that normal line law 
enforcement officers are neither trained nor equipped to deal with. Teams train in many 
different mission areas that include, but are not limited to: hostage rescue tactics, 
defensive tactics, combative subjects, response to high-risk situations, bus interdiction, 
warrant service, and room clearing in low- to high-risk incidents. 
 
4. Growth and Expansion 
As of 2000, it was estimated that approximately 90 percent of all law enforcement 
agencies in the United States that serve populations of 50,000 or more have some type of 
TOU.14  From the humble beginnings of the first SWAT programs in the early 1960s, 
programs have emerged at all levels of law enforcement.  With the enhanced security 
posture of the United States due to the recent terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the 
trend of creating specialized teams to handle specific threats will only continue to grow. 
In the 1980s, a law enforcement agency may have had to deploy its TOU only 
about once every month.  Today, the number of call-outs has risen dramatically and an 
agency may be required to deploy its TOU weekly, or even daily.  An average TOU of 
the 1980s conducted training for approximately 75 hours annually.  Today, the average 
training time that is devoted to tactical training has also increased to more than 225 hours 
per annum.15  
Due in large part to the rise in violent crime and the ever-present threat of 
terrorism, the growth of small town SWAT teams has been steadily on the rise.  SWAT 
teams are no longer limited to large metropolitan areas.  Currently, there are more than 30 
SWAT teams serving the Los Angeles, Orange County, and San Bernardino metropolitan 




area.16  The ideal size for a small town team is ten members, or two teams of five.  The 
five member teams consist of a four-man entry team supported by a sniper.  The 
requirement for two teams is ideal so that they may be mutually supportive of each other 
during an incident, or if the situation requires, they may operate independently during 
two separate incidents.17 
Start up costs for teams are estimated to be $6,000 to $7,000 per team member for 
initial training and equipment.  The follow-on costs for operating a small town team are 
estimated to be $50,000 annually.18 However, the annual operating costs to operate a full-
time team in a large metropolitan area such as the Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD) or the Chicago Police Department (CPD) SWAT teams averages $5,000,000.  It 
is also estimated that a federal level full-time support team has estimated annual costs of 
approximately $4,500,000 annually. 
Figure 1 below shows the estimated growth of both teams and budgets from 1967 
through 2000. 






























Figure 1.   THE GROWTH OF TOUS AND THEIR BUDGETS FROM 1967 TO 2000. 





D. POTENTIAL SWAT MARKETS 
Due to recent terrorist actions by both domestic and international terrorists, the 
United States has heightened its security posture for homeland defense.  However, 
domestic terrorism and violent crime are not the only reasons that security measures 
should be put in place.  Natural disasters can lead to power outages and evacuations that 
would require the protection of key infrastructure from looting and vandalism.  Key 
assets and facilities that require protection are ports, airports, power plants, governmental 
buildings and businesses and recreational facilities.  In the Los Angeles metropolitan 
area, there are several of these key facilities. 
These facilities have internal security teams but rely heavily on outside law 
enforcement agencies in the result of terrorist or unforeseen criminal actions.  The 
various SWAT teams throughout Los Angeles play a role in responding to these potential 
threats.  These facilities provide a potential future market for ASOC services.  
 
1. Ports 
The Port of Los Angeles is one of the world’s largest and busiest sea ports. The 
port has 27 cargo terminals and spans nearly 43 miles of waterfront. The entire port area 
spans more than 7,500 acres and has plans to expand an additional 600 acres in the future. 
The port generates more than $1.4B dollars in annual tax revenue and is a major 
employer for southern California.19  The port and its surrounding facilities are major 
targets for terrorism due to the major impact on commerce that crippling such a facility 
would cause.  
 
2. Public Utilities 
The public utilities infrastructure such as power production and delivery, 
communications, water and sewer services are all largely taken for granted in the United 
States.  The communications systems are vital to the coordination of emergency services 
during any incident or natural disaster.  Their disruption could have a catastrophic impact 
on emergency services when they are needed most.  Public utilities such as power 
                                                 
19 http://www.portoflosangeles.org 
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generation and distribution systems are mostly unsecured and are hard to patrol.  The 
water system, mainly the Los Angeles Aqueduct provides fresh potable water to the 
entire population that is estimated to be 10,103,000 people in 2004.20  If that system were 
to become contaminated in a terrorist attack, the results would be devastating. 
 
3. Airports/Railroads 
There are four large airports in what is referred to as the Los Angeles World 
Airport system.  The Los Angeles International, Ontario International, Van Nuys and 
Palmdale Regional airports are the four airports in the system.  The Los Angeles 
International Airport (LAX) by itself ranks fifth in the world for passengers emplaned 
and sixth in the world for air cargo tonnage handled.21  Since large volumes of both 
people and cargo move through the Los Angeles airport system, it is an obvious target for 
terrorism.  It is also a Point of Embarkation and a Point of Debarkation from which 
international travelers may arrive and depart the United States. Therefore, the airport 
system is a potential entry and exit point for international terrorists. 
Los Angeles also has a complex rail system consisting of the Metrolink system.  
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority also is a major player in the transportation 
systems of Los Angeles.  The rail systems in Los Angeles represent a potential target to 
hijackers, terrorists, and other criminals. 
 
4. State/Federal Government Buildings 
Numerous State and Federal Governmental buildings are in the Los Angeles area.  
As was the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, any building that houses a 
department or government agency is at risk and is a potential target for not only 
international terrorists, but domestic terrorist events as well.  Disruption of governmental 
agencies such as the Federal Reserve Bank Branch could have an economic impact on the 
local area and the nation as a whole if attacked. 




5. Businesses/Recreational Facilities 
Sporting arenas and private financial institutions and office buildings or any place 
where large numbers of people congregate to live, work and play are also potential 
targets for terrorist incidents.  In Los Angeles, the Staple Center and the Rose Bowl 
represent two of these high visibility recreational facilities.  The downtown area also is 
the home to numerous regional and national banks.   
The people of the United States place a high premium on their personal freedoms 
and wish to live and work in relative peace.  Securing these areas with minimum 
disruption to a person’s normal life is a key function of domestic security. 
 
E. HOW MUCH MONEY IS BEING SPENT AND WHERE 
The geographic focus of the research is on the metropolitan areas of southern 
California and Nevada.  The specific area focused on was the Los Angeles Metropolitan 
and surrounding areas, the Las Vegas Metropolitan area, and the San Diego Metropolitan 
area (See Figure 4).  The decision to use this area was based upon the current budget 
issues within the state of California, the high population density, and the high threat of 
possible terrorist attack(s).  Even though the initial market analysis will focus on Los 
Angeles, data was collected from the other southwest cities for future potential business 
phases of ASOC. 
 
1. Data 
The method used to collect data was through interviews, surveys, and statistical 
data.  The interviews were conducted face-to-face and by telephone.  The surveys were 
selectively e-mailed to numerous state and local police departments and law enforcement 
organizations in our target area.  Surveys were also filled out by law enforcement senior 
officials during a seminar that they attended. (See Appendix A for sample surveys and 
summary survey results) 
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2. Local Police Department Data Collection 
The research methodology for this marketing analysis of local police departments 
consisted of phone interviews and city SWAT budget information collection.  The 
research team for the project conducted phone interviews with local SWAT officers in 
Los Angeles and with the Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and San Diego Police Department 
budget personnel.  The interviews with the local SWAT officers focused on the 
organization of their SWAT teams, their training methods, and their knowledge of 
operating and training costs.  The interviews with the police department finance offices 
considered the SWAT budgets and police department budgets. 
The search for budget numbers from the police department budget offices 
revealed some interesting trends in visibility of budgeting information in police 
departments.  First, not all of the police departments maintain concise visibility of SWAT 
funding and spending.   While researching the budget numbers, only the Las Vegas 
Police Department provided concise, organized SWAT budget information.  The Los 
Angeles budget office provided satisfactory budget numbers for this analysis but had to 
draw from numerous sources.  These sources included the Metropolitan Division Budget, 
the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) budget office, and members of the Los 
Angeles SWAT team. 
The San Diego SWAT numbers are difficult to determine because they “do not 
have their own budget independent of the [San Diego Police] Department budget”. 22  
Thus, this research team only accurately determined two usable budget statistics --the 
overall SWAT budget for San Diego SWAT and its percentage of the overall San Diego 
Police Department budget. 
The interviews were primarily used with the large metropolitan area SWAT units 
and federal agencies to gain detailed operational and cost information.  The surveys were 
primarily used with small law enforcement agencies to collect specific information that 
could be consolidated to get an understanding of the average data for these smaller units. 
                                                 
22 Personal Interview: LAPD Budget Officer 
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Statistical data found at various government websites and federal agency websites was 
also used in this study. 
 
3. Federal Agency Data Collection 
The research team conducted phone interviews with various public affairs 
officers, operation officers, and team leaders to extrapolate information concerning 
federal agency SWAT teams.  These federal agency teams had different titles for their 
SWAT teams but each team had similar missions to traditional local SWAT teams. 
The federal agencies were much more protective of their SWAT team 
organizations, missions, and budgets than the local police departments.  Thus, the 
research team had to gather data from various sources including the internet, other 
interviews, and general knowledge.  Comparison methods with local SWAT teams to 
determine approximate organization and budgets of the federal agency teams were also 
used.  
 
F. LOCAL SWAT TEAMS – HOW MONEY IS BEING SPENT 
Again, for this market analysis, the initial focus of ASOC will be the local SWAT 
teams within the Los Angeles metropolitan area.  This metropolitan area consists of Los 
Angeles proper, Orange County, and San Bernardino – all of which are within the 
expanding sprawl of Los Angeles.  The local SWAT teams in Los Angeles consist 
primarily of the LAPD SWAT team and the Los Angeles County Sheriff SWAT team.  
There are also numerous smaller SWAT teams in various cities throughout the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area. 
 
1. Los Angeles Police Department and County Sheriff Department 
SWAT Teams 
The Los Angeles Police Department budget office provided adequate information 
to determine their total annual cost.  There was a requirement to extrapolate data, from 
various sources throughout the department.  The primary cause for the difficulty in 
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determining the budget of the Los Angeles SWAT team was that the team falls under the 
Metropolitan department of the LAPD.  Thus, many of their costs are not separated from 
their parent organization’s budget. (See Appendix F) 
In order to collect usable data, the budget office helped to sift through the 
numbers.  They provided the annual salaries for the different grades of officers to 
determine personnel costs.  They also provided the operating expenses for SWAT from 
their finance office.  These operating expenses included an expense fund for equipment 
and range fees.  During an interview with a SWAT team member, the number of vehicles 
on the team and the number of personnel by rank was reported, which allowed us to 
extrapolate the maintenance and personnel costs for their vehicles. 
Several assumptions were used to determine the costs for Los Angeles SWAT.  
First, all of the start-up costs and sunk costs did not include the purchase price of vehicles 
and equipment in the annual costs of the team.  Second, the Las Vegas SWAT 
maintenance costs on vehicles was taken and multiplied by two because the LAPD 
SWAT team is twice as large as Las Vegas SWAT.  Third, a vehicle life of 5 years was 
assumed, which converts to the replacement of approximately 7 vehicles per year.  At an 
estimated cost of $40,000 per vehicle, ASOC determined an approximation of vehicle 
replacement costs, which was not covered in the annual equipment expense fund. (See 
Appendix F) 
Based on these assumptions, it was determined that the total annual cost for the 
LAPD SWAT team is $5,192,035.  Because LAPD SWAT falls under the Metropolitan 
Department of the LAPD, a portion of its annual money is not traceable by the budget 
analysts.  Therefore, the cost of the SWAT team is conservative.  It is likely understated, 
which is acceptable for this market analysis.23 
The Los Angeles County Sheriff SWAT team is the other large SWAT 
organization in the Los Angles area.  Their team is considered comparable in size and 
capability to the LAPD SWAT Team.  The Los Angeles County Sheriff SWAT team 
consists of 80 personnel with internal K-9 units and paramedics.  Unlike other local 
                                                 
23 Personal Interview: LAPD SWAT Member 
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SWAT teams, the Los Angeles County Sheriff SWAT team performs a wider array of 
missions and contracts SWAT services to over 41 different cities throughout Los Angeles 
County.  Because of their similar size to LAPD SWAT, the approximated the annual cost 
for their team at $5,000,000.24 
 
2. Smaller Los Angeles SWAT Teams 
The small city SWAT costs were more difficult to estimate than the large city 
SWAT teams because there are numerous SWAT teams throughout the Los Angeles 
metropolitan region.  Forty-five surveys were sent to police departments throughout the 
area and received back fourteen surveys.  The research team was amazed at how many 
responding small police departments had internal SWAT teams.  Most of these SWAT 
teams were every-day police officers with extra training, not full-time professional 
SWAT officers like the LAPD SWAT team. (See Appendix F) 
The inconsistency of small city SWAT teams forced researchers to take the 
average costs of the SWAT teams using the surveys.  It was determined the average 
annual cost per small city team was $50,000.  This value did not include the salaries of 
the officer’s because most of them were not full-time SWAT officers.  This value gives a 
decent approximation of the costs of the small city SWAT teams, but tends to be a 
conservative estimate.  Thus, costs were likely understated, which is preferred to 
overstating the costs or biasing the market analysis. 
The other variable that was used to determine these SWAT costs was the number 
of SWAT organizations in the Los Angeles area.  It was determined that there were 30 
smaller SWAT teams in the Los Angeles area from the United States Department of 
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics.25 (See Appendix C)  By multiplying the number of 
SWAT teams by the average annual cost of the small city teams, it was conservatively 
calculated the total small city SWAT costs to be $1,500,000 per year. 
 
                                                 
24 Personal Interview: Los Angeles County Sheriff 
25 http:/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/lem00lo.pdf 
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3. Total Local Swat Costs in Los Angeles Area 
The total local SWAT costs in the Los Angeles area are the sum of the LAPD 
SWAT team costs, the Los Angeles County Sheriff SWAT costs, and the 30 small-city 
SWAT teams in Los Angeles, Orange County, and San Bernardino.  The total money 
being spent on local SWAT costs is $11,692,035.  This value represents the size of the 
potential local SWAT market in Los Angeles. (See Appendix B) 
 
G. FEDERAL AGENCY SWAT TEAMS – HOW MONEY IS BEING SPENT 
Unlike the local police SWAT teams, the Federal Agency SWAT teams are much 
more secretive of their organization and budgeting.  Therefore, much of the local police 
SWAT budgets were used to approximate the agency budgets. 
 
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Enhanced Teams 
The FBI has a robust SWAT capability both at the federal and local levels.  In the 
Los Angeles area, the FBI has their version of SWAT called an Enhanced Team.  This 
team is regional and focuses on the West Coast.  They also perform extraterritorial duties 
throughout the world.  This team is very competent but still is a collateral duty for the 
FBI agents involved.  The agents in the team spend approximately one-third of their time 
conducting SWAT missions.  The Enhanced Team has 46 operators with a total of 60 
members including electronic specialists, tactical operation center coordinators, and crisis 
negotiators.  The Enhanced Team responds to federal violations including bank robberies, 
kidnappings, gang violence, drug incidents, and hijackings.  They conduct 30 to 45 
operations each year throughout the west coast.  The Los Angeles team is considered the 
busiest Enhanced Team in the FBI. 
The Enhanced Team budget is very similar to LAPD SWAT with the following 
annual operational and training budget: ammunition - $40,000, supplemental funds -- 
$30,000, and additional Los Angeles funds -- $10,000.  Using this operational and 
21 
training budget along with equipment and personnel costs similar to LAPD SWAT, it was 
approximated the FBI Los Angeles Enhancement Team annual costs were $4,500,000.26 
 
2. Marshal Arrest Response Team 
The Marshal Service’s SWAT equivalent is an Arrest Response Team (ART).  
These ART teams are located in central and southern California with one located in Los 
Angeles.  These teams consist of 12 to 15 people and use much of the same tactics and 
equipment as typical SWAT teams.27 Based upon its size compared to Las Vegas and Los 
Angeles SWAT teams, we approximated the ART annual cost at $1,000,000. 
 
3. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms SWAT  
The Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agency (ATF) also have SWAT 
capabilities.  Their Special Response Team is regional with its western team located in 
Los Angeles.  These annual costs were approximated at $1,000,000.28 
 
4. Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team 
The Coast Guard has a Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) in Los 
Angeles that performs SWAT duties throughout the region.  Their primary mission is 
security for the Port of Los Angeles but they maintain flexibility to perform broader 
missions, primarily with anti-terrorist threats.  The MSST has 107 members comprised of 
both active and reserve sailors.  Within the MSST, there is a 20 member Non-Compliance 
Boarding Team that handles the high-risk threats.  The MSST annual budget is 
$1,400,000.29 
                                                 
26 Personal Interview: Los Angeles FBI Enhancement Commander 
27 Personal Interview: Arrest Response Team Public Affairs Officer 
28 Personal Interview: ATF Special Response Team Commander 
29 Personal Interview: MSST Budget Specialist 
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5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau Teams 
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau also has SWAT capabilities 
with action teams.  Annual costs in the Los Angeles area were approximated at 
$1,000,000 due to the proximity to the Mexican border.  It was assumed that they did not 
have as robust of a capability as LAPD SWAT.30 
 
6. Drug Enforcement Agency Mobile Enforcement Teams 
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has SWAT capability in its Mobile 
Enforcement Teams.  These teams focus on arresting high-risk drug traffickers.  The 
research team assumed these Mobile Enforcement Teams to have similar capability, size, 
and equipment to the LAPD SWAT primarily due to the proximity to the Mexican border 
and the heavy methamphetamine lab activity in the region.  Thus, it was approximated 
that the DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams have an annual budget of $4,500,000.31 
 
7. Total Federal Agency SWAT Costs 
The total money spent by the government on federal agency SWAT costs in the 
Los Angeles area is $13,800,000.  This amount includes all of the costs of the agencies 
discussed above and is an estimate of the size of the federal agency SWAT market in Los 
Angeles. (See Appendix B) 
 
H. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT MONEY 
With the increasing role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Congress has dramatically increased their annual budget to over $30B in 2004.  The DHS 
has offered this money to state and local governments to help them protect against 
various outside threats --primarily terrorism.  DHS allows state and local governments to 
request grants and has designated money for various metropolitan areas such as Los 
Angeles.  Two grant programs designate money for Los Angeles --the Urban Areas 
                                                 
30 http://www.ice.gov 
31 Personal Interview: DEA Public Affairs Officer 
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Security Initiative (UASI) and the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).  This 
money represents additional federal money that ASOC could resource in the SWAT 
market through the state and local government contracts. 
 
1. Urban Areas Security Initiative 
The FY 2004 UASI is a program intended “to create a sustainable national model 
program to enhance security and overall preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from acts of terrorism.  This program will also provide funding to identified mass transit 
systems to enhance security at these critical infrastructure facilities…. Urban areas are 
encouraged to employ regional approaches to planning and preparedness and to adopt 
regional response structures whenever appropriate to meet the needs identified through 
the assessments and in the urban area strategy.”32 This initiative addresses similar goals 
as ASOC and is a potential source of revenue for the company. 
The designated money for the city and county of Los Angeles is a grant award of 
$28,268,504.  The designated money for the city of Long Beach within Los Angeles is an 
additional $12,136,091.  The UASI also designates the awarding of money to the Los 
Angeles Transit Security Program.  This program has $1,982,809 designated for the Los 
Angeles Metrolink and $800,000 for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority.  Thus, the total available Homeland Security funding through 
the UASI is $43,187,404.33 (See Appendix B) 
 
2. Homeland Security Grant Program 
The FY 2004 HSGP consists of three grant programs: State Homeland Security 
Program (SHSP), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), and Citizen 
Corps Program (CCP).  The two grant programs that apply to the ASOC market are the 
SHSP and the LETPP. 




The 2004 SHSP “provides funds for homeland security…and for costs associated 
with implementing State Homeland Security Assessments and Strategies (SHSAS).”34  
The SHSP program allocated $133,964,000 to California of which we assumed 25 
percent to apply to the Los Angeles area.  This adjusted allocation was $33,491,000 of 
additional money to be considered in the Homeland Security available funds grant 
funds.35 
The 2004 LETPP provides law enforcement funding for prevention activities such 
as “intervention of terrorists before they can execute a threat.”36  The LETPP allocation 
for California is $39,752,000 of which we assumed 25 percent to apply to the Los 
Angeles area.  This adjusted allocation was $9,938,000.  Thus, the total applicable HSGP 
money was $43,429,000. (See Appendix B) 
In the DHS overview for this grant program, it encourages the states to “employ 
regional approaches to planning and preparedness and to adopt regional response 
structures whenever appropriate…. Security and preparedness officials at all levels 
should seek opportunities to leverage funding from multiple sources whenever possible 
and not restrict their activities to federal funding alone.”37 Therefore, the HSGP fits 
nicely with a potential ASOC market. 
 
3. Total Homeland Security Grant Money Available 
The total available grant funds from DHS including the UASI Grant Program and 
Transit Program and the HSGP are $86,616,404.  These DHS grant funds account for 77 
percent of the available money in the SWAT market for the Los Angeles area.  This 
Homeland Security funding changes each year but should stay relatively constant or 
increase in future years due to the expected longevity of the War on Terrorism and the 
increasing size and influence of DHS. (See Appendix B) 






I. TOTAL AVAILABLE MONEY IN THE LOS ANGELES SWAT MARKET 
Based upon the total costs of the local SWAT teams, the federal agency SWAT 
teams, and applicable Homeland Security Grant Money, the total available money in the 
Los Angeles SWAT market is $112,108,439.  This value represents a potential SWAT 
market in the Los Angeles area. 
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Figure 2.   AVAILABLE SWAT MARKET MONEY 
 
J. OVERLAPPING USES OF AVAILABLE MONEY IN THE LOS 
ANGELES SWAT MARKET 
As discussed throughout this chapter, SWAT teams are pervasive throughout the 
local and federal law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles.  This pervasive nature of the 
SWAT teams leads to possible redundancy both in Los Angeles’ SWAT mission and 
spending.  The reason for the redundancy is primarily due to the difficulty of 
coordinating the efforts of the various SWAT organizations and also due to the 
geographical size of the area.  There are numerous examples of overlapping SWAT 
capabilities in Los Angeles. 
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1. Port of Los Angeles 
The Port of Los Angeles located in Long Beach, CA aptly demonstrates the 
overlap of law enforcement and SWAT.  Lieutenant Commander Mike Trevett of the 
Marine Security Office of Long Beach stated that there is definite overlap in the security 
of the port with no unity of command.  He discussed the similar roles of the port police, 
the Marine Security Office, the Coast Guard Maritime and Security Team, the LAPD, 
and the Navy in securing the port.  They all have arresting authority on the high seas and 
significant direct and indirect SWAT capabilities. 
 
2. Local Police SWAT teams 
As discussed above, there are 30 small city SWAT teams throughout Los 
Angeles.  There also are the LAPD and Los Angeles County Sheriff SWAT teams that 
perform similar missions.  These 32 local police SWAT teams definitely create 
redundancy in the Los Angeles SWAT capabilities.  Even though Los Angeles and 
Orange County are spread over 4850 square miles (California is 163,696 square miles.), 
they still have approximately one local police SWAT team for every 87 square miles.  
This number of teams does not include the federal agencies.38 
 
3. Federal Agency SWAT Teams 
As stated earlier in this chapter, there are various federal agencies that maintain 
SWAT equivalent teams in the Los Angeles area.  These agencies include the FBI, the 
Federal Marshall Service, the ATF, the Coast Guard, the DEA, and Customs.  All of 
these agencies believe their SWAT capability is necessary but all of them have similar 
broad missions with minor differences in focus. 
All of the agencies view one of their missions as maritime interdiction even 
though the Coast Guard considers that their primary focus.  The Marshalls focus on high-
risk arrests whether on the water or land.  The DEA focuses on maritime interdiction 
                                                 
38 http://arb.ca.gov/msei/on-road/briefs/Publication1.pdf 
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when drugs are concerned.  Customs also deals with maritime security primarily with 
illegal aliens and illegal shipping of goods.  Even LAPD SWAT sometimes responds to 
these threats.  Thus, there is redundancy in the maritime security mission between the 
federal agencies, which translates into redundant SWAT missions. 
The same focus for land interdiction is true.  All of the local and federal SWAT 
capabilities cater to land SWAT missions.  Even the Coast Guard conducts land missions 
with its MSST team.  Even though numerous SWAT teams are necessary for special 
situations such as terrorist attacks or police task force missions such as gang warfare, the 
myriad of various teams have redundant missions. 
 
4. Total Money Spent on Overlapping Missions 
ASOC assumes that the FBI Enhanced Team, LAPD SWAT, and Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department SWAT missions overlap but remain necessary.  The FBI 
Enhanced Team must respond to federal violations.  The LAPD SWAT and Los Angeles 
County SWAT cover the local SWAT missions and combine forces in manpower 
intensive SWAT missions.  Therefore, the remaining SWAT costs that overlap equal are 
$10,800,000. 
SWAT OVERLAP MARKET
Coast  Guard-MSST, 
$1,400,000
Cust oms Act ion Team, 
$1,400,000
DEA, $4,500,000
ATF Regional Act ion Team, 
$1,000,000
Marshal Arrest  Response 
Team, $1,000,000





ATF Regional Action Team
Marshal Arrest Response Team
Small SWAT Teams
Total Overlap Market =$10,800,000
 





K. MARKET ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Los Angeles SWAT market is substantial with a potential 
market of $112,108,439.  Taking into account potential overlapping SWAT funding, the 
initial redundant funds for SWAT missions in Los Angeles are $10,800,000.  This 
redundant SWAT market represents immediate business opportunities. 
Another potential weakness in the SWAT market is a lack of coordination 
between the various SWAT organizations.  The only element of the SWAT market 
attempting to fill this role is the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department SWAT but 
they do not cover all the local police SWAT teams and federal agencies.  Thus, the Los 
Angeles SWAT market is ripe with business opportunities for capable and competent 
security experts.  
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III. CAPABILITIES 
A. NATIONAL NEEDS 
As the War on Terrorism continues, America will be constantly under threat of 
attack.  The misfortune of 9/11 was a direct result of the law enforcement and intelligent 
failure to foresee the attack.  If a second attack were to occur, the public would be less 
likely to understand or tolerate the incident.  President George W. Bush identified six 
critical mission areas in the “National Strategy for Homeland Security” issued in 2002.  
The six critical mission areas are: 
1. Intelligence and Early Warning  
2. Border and Transportation Security  
3. Domestic Counterterrorism  
4. Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets  
5. Defending against Catastrophic Threats  
6. Emergency Preparedness and Response  
The ASOC SWAT Initiative is applicable to all of these critical mission areas.  
There have also been questions whether domestic law enforcement resources are up to 
the challenge of combating global terrorism and meeting all of its other responsibilities at 
the same time, or if it even should.39 
 
B. PHASES FOR MARKET ENTRY 
ASOC intends to break its growth and development into three phases.  In each 
phase, the company must realistically determine what services it is able to provide with 
the capital assets it can obtain.  The phases are intended to build upon each other to be 
mutually supportive and provide a solid base for the final business structure that will 
                                                 
39 http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/HL791.cfm 
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incorporate national and international strategies.  A brief overview of these phases is 
described here with a more detailed description and list of capabilities presented in the 
rest of this chapter.  The final part of this chapter will discuss projected assets that will be 
needed to provide the capabilities described in each of the phases. 
During the implementation phase, or Phase 1, ASOC will act as a security 
consultation and coordination firm. ASOC will provide expert advice in matters 
concerning security operations for local law enforcement agencies.  ASOC will also act 
as a central point of contact for the coordination of command and control operations for 
emergency response. 
Phases 2 and 3 will introduce actual operating teams into the market environment. 
Phase 2 will stand up one team in California. Once that team is well established and the 
operating characteristics are evaluated and proven to be sound, Phase 3 will establish 
several teams to handle the southern half of California.  Future growth projections will 
encompass covering the rest of the United States and then working into the potential 
international markets. 
 
1. Phase 1 
Phase 1 will focus on what the three existing members forming ASOC can 
accomplish with the resources at hand.  All members are military officers with extensive 
background in military and leadership training.  Backgrounds include extensive travel 
overseas with detailed knowledge of terrorist and criminal organizations.  This 
experience is critical in knowing the training, tactics and procedures for these adversarial 
groups.  These tactics are unfamiliar to most law enforcement agencies in the United 
States.  They may have a hard time understanding the culture and motivations behind 
these organizations. 
ASOC’s members are also heavily experienced in working in joint operational 
environments that are chaotic and require heavy command and control and flexibility.  
This experience will transfer when working with numerous local, state and federal law 
enforcement agencies.  ASOC also has the experience in motivating people to work 
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together as a team even if they come from different organizations and backgrounds.  The 
ability to oversee political and competitive budgeting issues is an important step in 
coordinating the operational focus of local anti-terrorist groups.  The following are the 
capabilities that ASOC can provide in Phase 1. 
 
a. Red Cell 
Red Cell teams are generally a group that plays an adversarial role to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of an organization.  This way the organization 
can realize its true vulnerability without the consequences that result from a real attack.  
ASOC members can play a critical role in assessing “Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets” of Los Angeles and surrounding areas.  Through extensive area studies, the team 
members can determine the most likely or possible targets that terrorists may attack.  By 
thinking like terrorists, these members can have insight into weaknesses in the city’s 
infrastructure. 
Using this information, the city can assess what needs to be done to reduce 
the possibility of attack and make these targets harder to exploit.  The Red Cell members 
will also gain useful insight into the city infrastructure and possible terrorist targets.  
They will learn detailed information needed for future operations against terrorists at 
these locations that could prove useful in Phase 2 and 3. 
 
b. Special Event Security Consultation 
In the event of special occasions that call for added security because of 
possible terrorist incidents, ASOC could provide the added measures required.  High 
visibility events such as Presidential visits and international sporting events may require 
large amounts of security.  ASOC could assess area security forces and personnel 
protection forces and make recommendations to ensure the best security possible. 
This type of interaction will also facilitate numerous contacts and build 
confidence in ASOC that will help to implement Phase 2 and 3. 
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c. Maritime Ship Boarding Consulting 
Since 9/11, even the Coast Guard has been looking to create its own 
SWAT team to combat terrorism.  Faced with the growing possibility and concern toward 
the vast number of merchant vessels entering the United States that could allow terrorist 
threats to sneak into the country, the Coast Guard is proposing a budget to create a ship-
boarding team to deal with hostile scenarios.  One such team has already been created for 
New York Harbor.40 
In extremis ship boarding is a very dangerous task for forces trained in this 
area, and almost certainly will result in huge casualties for those untrained.  ASOC has 
extensive knowledge in ship boarding tactics, techniques and procedures to ensure 
maximum success with minimum casualties.  Being hired as consultants to help direct in 
the training of these forces could easily give ASOC another firm foothold with these 
units. 
 
d. Coordination Consulting 
One continuous resounding issue from the interviews and surveys 
conducted was the lack of local law enforcement coordination between different assets.  
Multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams are all but impossible due to political constraints and 
budgetary battles.  Huge amounts of tax dollars are being wasted for substandard 
performance and overlapping SWAT coverage due to the way the system is set up. 
ASOC could provide the middle ground as consultants hired to coordinate 
the various SWAT units in Los Angeles.  If all the units used the same tactics, 
communication gear, and shared intelligence, then all their capabilities would grow 
exponentially.  It is impossible however, to give one competitive unit the leadership role 
over the others to decide what will be done.  As outside consultants, ASOC could make a 
fair and biased judgment about what the best standard of radios, operational gear and 
other equipment should be.  It also could establish a state-of-the-art communication 
                                                 
40 http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press_releases/PR02026.html 
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center that could coordinate between the various SWAT units during high-stress crisis 
situations and day-to-day training operations. 
 
e. Grant Consulting 
As explained earlier, the amount of federal grants being offered at the 
local law enforcement level is very large.  Most local law enforcement agencies surveyed 
did not seem to have a grasp the current procedures and possibilities of these grants.  As 
with most federal funding, much paperwork and expertise must be invested to obtain a 
fair share of the funding. 
ASOC could provide a service to small local law enforcement agencies to 
help file and track these funds.  It could provide the learned knowledge to all the agencies 
without each having to go through the time and learning curve involved in obtaining the 
funds individually. 
 
2. PHASE 2 
In Phase 2, all of the capabilities of Phase 1 will continue to be offered.  However, 
ASOC will now use funds and cash flow obtained from Phase 1 to stand up one SWAT 
team in Los Angeles to provide additional capabilities.  The tentative size of Phase 2 
ASOC will be 26 employees. (See Appendix D)  This team will train constantly to be at 
the highest level of readiness at a moments notice and strive to set a standard higher than 
other local area teams. 
ASOC will use contacts and street credit obtained in Phase 1 to solicit the services 
of its team to augment local law enforcement capabilities.  With an extensive working 
knowledge of all the different agencies in the area as well as the knowledge of existing 
capital constraints, it can market itself to the areas that most need it and have the funds to 
purchase its services. 
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a. Emergency Response 
For domestic counterterrorism, the key is timely and accurate intelligence.  
Once intelligence is obtained, a counterterrorist unit needs to be employed.  There are 
already several national counterterrorist units in the United States dedicated to act on 
such information.  The most important product that ASOC’s SWAT team can offer is a 
response that is faster and more knowledgeable on the local level than its national 
counterparts. 
ASOC will also be able to provide a local expertise on the layout and 
infrastructure of their specific cities.  Having a SWAT team that specifically trains on 
integration with the local law enforcement assets in their area is critical.  This is 
something that national teams only do with the largest metropolitan areas.  This team will 
not be in competition with Los Angeles SWAT, but directed more at an augmentation of 
smaller area SWAT teams and provide services in the Los Angeles area that the current 
teams do not provide. 
In addition to augmentation of local SWAT teams, ASOC will target areas 
that have no SWAT coverage due to funding constraints.  The ability of ASOC’s team to 
cover multiple areas will make SWAT service cost effective for anyone.  This service 
will be similar to the growing trend in new Florida suburban areas to outsource all the 
cities services.  This keeps costs and taxes low by hiring others to run police, fire, 
emergency rescue, water, parks and recreation, zoning and other departments.41 
 
b. Special Event Security 
With this added SWAT team capability, ASOC could augment area 
security forces and personnel protection forces.  Utilizing this added asset at their 
disposal would help increase police manpower and could prevent or reduce the threat 
posed at such events.  These events also allow ASOC and their law enforcement 
counterparts an increased opportunity to work together and ensure smooth 
communications and interoperability. 
                                                 
41 http://www.waterindustry.org/Water-Facts/florida-con-ops.htm 
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c. High Risk Targets 
Numerous high risk targets in the Los Angeles area are vulnerable to 
terrorist attack or exploitation.  ASOC could provide security at these locations utilizing 
team members or contract to provide reaction teams to these specific facilities.  This 
would allow the team to train to a specific location and have complete knowledge of how 
to attack or defend these facilities. 
 
d. Networking through Social Capital 
Social capital is the trust and goodwill developed by people, communities, 
corporations and nations.  Networks need trust to work and when working, they generate 
trust.  Networks tie together trust and reciprocity - the important factors of social capital. 
When trust between people spreads, social capital is built.  When this 
social capital spreads to new areas, new networks are created by reciprocity.  “When I do 
something for you, I expect you to do something for me now or in the future.  When you 
do something for me in return we have just formed a trusting relationship.  As we build 
these bonds with others, we develop a network based on trust.”  As this network 
continues to grow over time our trust becomes stronger. 
During the current activities listed above, ASOC will begin to work 
closely with intelligence and information gathering assets.  As these relationships build 
ASOC will begin to become a hub that intelligence can filter through.  Due to political 
and budgetary conflicts, most intelligence sources do not share information.  This is 
inherent due to the system that is currently in place where departments that get the credit 
for discovering more information get more money at the end of the year.  This system, in 
essence, rewards information hoarding. 
ASOC’s non-affiliation with any department should give credit to the 
proper source for any information it acts upon.  This will create a relationship where 
departments that have information will pass it to ASOC to act upon because of trust.  
This will allow ASOC to increase its operations against terrorists and criminals and gain 
increased reputation as an operational unit.   
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As this dynamic grows, it will push ASOC into the center of an unofficial 
“intelligence network” where everyone is able to benefit and be more effective. 
 
3. PHASE 3 
Phase 3 will incorporate capabilities from Phase 1 and Phase 2 as well as expand 
on Phase 2 initiation of SWAT teams.  ASOC will introduce as many new teams as 
needed to meet market demand in the Los Angeles - Las Vegas - San Diego area.  The 
tentative size of Phase 3 ASOC will be 61 employees. (See Appendix E)  Within this 
triangle of southern California, ASOC will create a network that is centralized to provide 
rapid response to any area.  These teams will add the ability to expand the area covered 
for emergency response, special event security, personal protection and high risk target 
protection. 
By adding helicopter assets, ASOC can minimize reaction time to one-hour 
during both day and night.  They can accomplish this reaction time by having one SWAT 
team on a 24-hour standby at a centralized headquarters.  Teams will rotate standby time 
with training and off-time cycles to ensure maximum proficiency from training and 
plenty of rest to stay sharp and focused. 
 
Figure 4.   PHASE 3 TRIANGLE 
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a. Maritime Ship Boarding 
With the vast number of ports and coastline, the Coast Guard is strapped 
for resources to cover all areas.  The last thing the Coast Guard should be doing is taking 
personnel, money, and time away from their core competency.  ASOC’s close proximity 
to both Los Angeles and San Diego ports of entry creates an opportunity for authorities to 
utilize ASOC’s Maritime Assault Team as an asset in hostile ship scenarios.  This will 
allow the Coast Guard to focus its assets on the jobs that it does best and leave ASOC to 
train a mission specific assault team to handle any incidents along the specified coastline. 
 
b. Training Site 
Training is a continuous cycle to maintain peak readiness.  The surveys of 
small local law enforcement show that these units get an average of four hours in training 
a week.  This is insufficient to train for hostage-rescue, anti-terrorism operations and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenarios.  ASOC teams will train between 20 to 
40 hours a week to achieve superior performance, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
Combined integrated training with law enforcement officers in their cities 
is important to mission success and interoperability.  It allows bonds between 
respondents as well as creating standard operating procedures and understandings.  Law 
enforcement personnel will also travel to and train at the ASOC SWAT Headquarters 
which will be centrally located in the focus area.  The Headquarters will have state of the 
art training facilities to include: numerous shooting ranges, mock urban training city, 
sniper tower, numerous close quarter battle sites, breaching area and areas for helicopter 
work.  Helicopter work will entail fast-roping, rappelling, and shooting from the 
helicopters. 
This site will be the primary training area for ASOC and will house all of 
its equipment and offices.  Personnel on standby will also remain overnight at the facility 
to provide a rapid response team available to respond at a moments notice. 
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C. PERSONNEL 
1. Current Law Enforcement Swat  
One of the primary sources of recruiting for ASOC will be from current local law 
enforcement SWAT members.  Recruiting from current members allows for a quick base 
competency of SWAT techniques, weapons and training.  By hiring these local law 
enforcement members, there is already knowledge of legal responsibilities and issues.  
Hiring from local areas also increases the ease of future interoperability with local law 
enforcement and knowledge of the operational area. 
 
2. Ex-Military Special Operations Forces 
Hiring ex-military Special Operations Forces (SOF) will also give ASOC a base 
competence and knowledge of conducting anti-terrorist type missions.  By hiring SOF, 
ASOC provides a working knowledge of terrorist tactics, methodologies and cultures.  
These forces have a better understanding of anti-terrorist tactics and techniques than local 
law enforcement SWAT team.  The maritime SOF forces are also experts at ship-
boarding operations and will provide extensive knowledge for creating this element of 
ASOC. 
SOF is also more focused on direct assault and hostage rescue procedures where 
violence of action is required.  The public law enforcement are more focused on arrests 
and drug operations as opposed to target assault and hostage rescue.  The key advantage 
to using these former SWAT members and SOF together is that ASOC will get a cross 
pollination of understanding local laws and procedures combined with violence of action 
required in anti-terrorism. 
 
D. EQUIPMENT 
By utilizing one centralized SWAT team to provide the services listed above, 
ASOC is fiscally able to outfit its teams with superior assets.  From the surveys, ASOC 
was able to determine that the small local SWAT teams lack critical assets that would be 
needed in a terrorist situation.  Most teams rely on their police issue vehicles and 
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equipment to conduct such operations.  These teams lack special infra-red, thermal and 
other optical equipment that may be a deciding factor in mission success.  The list of 
equipment shortfalls for these units is extensive. 
All of the proposed equipment for ASOC will not be listed in this project due to 
security concerns, but a breakdown of some of the larger assets are listed below.  Again, 
with the proper superior equipment ASOC and its clients’ are one step closer to ensuring 
themselves of mission success and mitigating mission failure. (See Appendix D & E) 
 
1. Helicopters 
ASOC will lease three BELL 430 Law Enforcement helicopters for operations 
and training.  These helicopters provide superior lift capability and an eleven person 
capacity each.  Most importantly, this air frame will allow prolonged operational support 
because the platform can stay airborne for 3.8 hours without refueling. 
Helicopters will allow a quick response time to any location within the specified 
area.  They can insert sniper teams onto rooftop positions and provide sniper-based 
platforms to maneuver around targets.  Helicopters also provide additional real time 
intelligence and video capabilities as they happen.  These assets can also provide vehicle 
and personnel tracking capabilities that can be crucial. 
 
 






2. Armored Suburbans 
Vehicles can also play a crucial role in target assaults.  Helicopter operations may 
tip off terrorists that an assault is in progress before the assaulters can arrive.  Vehicles 
are quieter and can provide extra protection until the last possible moment of entry into a 
target. 
ASOC is planning on utilizing armored Suburbans to provide extra protection for 
assaulters and to also use during personnel protective details. Extensive instruction in 
combat driving will also be incorporated in the training cycle so that the full effectiveness 
of these vehicles can be utilized. 
 
Figure 6.   ARMORED SUBURBAN 
 
E. WEAPONS 
Proper weapons systems are also important to specific missions.  ASOC will 
utilize various weapons systems depending on the operation.  Some of the weapons 
systems that may be used include the Colt M4 Carbine which is a 5.56mm rifle that is 
light, dependable and highly accurate to provide firepower outside of buildings.  
 
Figure 7.   COLT M4 CARBINE 
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The Colt 9mm Submachine gun is smaller for better maneuverability indoors and 
provides the subsonic 9mm round that will decrease wall penetration in close combat 
operations.  
 
Figure 8.   COLT 9MM SUBMACHINE GUN 
 





Figure 9.   COLT 45 CALIBER PISTOL 
 
Sniper teams and breaching teams will carry weapons specific to the actions 
required.  Sniper weapons are primarily determined using metrics of distance, 
surrounding area and results desired from the ballistic round. 
 
F. FUTURE 
The future desire of ASOC, after the California Initiative is proven, is to create a 
network of SWAT teams across the United States that will be interlocked and mutually 
supportive.  The average number of ASOC locations needed for each state is projected at 
two.  Competition is expected and will prevent ASOC from obtaining all of these 
contracts.  Being first to market and having the corporate knowledge will benefit ASOC 
in its bids for these contracts.  If ASOC can procure and maintain half of these contracts, 
it should expect to provide close to fifty locations nationwide.   
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After developing a nationwide presence, ASOC may look at the possibilities of 
overseas markets as a strategic target.  However, the opportunity for growth and funding 
are currently highest in the southern California area.  The possibility of success for 
ASOC is best in the California area with the capabilities listed above.  Any future 
strategic movement into the national or international arena will have to be researched at 
the appropriate time. 
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IV. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND 
THREATS ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The ASOC SWAT Initiative desires to provide Special Weapons and Tactics 
services to those communities that are impacted by both criminal and terrorist activities.  
As long as these activities exist, a need will exist for highly specialized and trained 
professionals capable of carrying out high-risk operations.  The Privatized Military 
Industry (PMI) and private security companies presently occupy only a small niche in the 
industry that has been previously considered to be a public good.  Due to the trend in 
governmental privatization and globalization of services, the possibilities for expansion 
and growth in this market are broad. 
An analysis of the internal strengths and weaknesses of ASOC compared to the 
industry’s opportunities and threats is called a SWOT analysis.  This SWOT analysis will 
allow the visionaries of ASOC to determine if there is a fit between the private SWAT 
market and ASOC’s potential strategy. 
 
1. Environment 
The overall market for the ASOC SWAT Initiative is new.  While there are 
existing companies that provide private security services, there are few companies that 
perform the high risk operations and none that perform the specific missions of a SWAT 
team. 
The market volume for the need of a privatized SWAT company would vary 
greatly depending upon population density, community wealth and other factors.  The 
future projections of communities entering into contracts with a privatized security 
company cannot be determined with guaranteed accuracy.  The reasons for possible 
hesitancy to embrace privatized SWAT are numerous and varied.  For example, 
entrenched law enforcement agencies and union representatives would certainly balk at 
the possibility of losing jobs to a private firm.  Also, community leaders and private 
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citizens may be resistant to having their security needs met by a company that is profit 
driven and whose span of control and responsibility is outlined in specific legal language. 
 
2. Implementation 
The services that ASOC intends to provide will be determined by the needs of the 
communities it serves.  ASOC plans to use a 3-Phase business strategy to enter the 
private SWAT market.  During the implementation phase, or Phase 1, ASOC will act as a 
security consultation and coordination firm.  ASOC will provide expert advice in matters 
concerning security operations for local law enforcement agencies.  ASOC will also act 
as a central point of contact for the coordination of command and control operations for 
emergency response. 
Phases 2 and 3 will introduce actual operating teams into the market environment. 
Phase 2 will stand up one team in the Los Angeles region.  Once that team is well 
established and the operating characteristics are evaluated and proven to be sound, Phase 
3 with full-scale regional deployment will commence. 
An analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats during each of 
the phases will help ASOC management focus on information that will match the firm’s 
resources and capabilities to the competitive environments in which the firm will 
operating during the three- phase implementation plan. 
 
B. STRENGTHS 
1. Phase 1 – Consulting and Coordination 
a. Management/Command and Control Skills 
Military professional officers are heavily trained in management 
techniques. ASOC’s initial management team will consist of three military officers each 
having a diverse and unique background rich in management and command and control 
skills.  One of the members has command experience in military units ranging from 15 to 
more than 400 soldiers.  This ability to coordinate personnel and equipment in high-
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intensity combat situations will translate directly to ASOC’s mission of coordinating 
multi-dimensional SWAT units in volatile situations. 
 
b. Special Warfare Training 
ASOC’s initial management team will also have a member that has 
Special Warfare training.  As a Navy SEAL, the member will bring a unique sense of 
credibility to the firm as well as a plethora of knowledge in anti-terror and special 
mission tactics. 
 
2. Phases 2 And 3 - Operations 
a. Full-Time On-Call Swat Capability 
ASOC will have the ability to provide municipalities with full-time on-call 
SWAT capability.  With units on 24 hour standby and the availability of air assets, 
ASOC’s average response time will be one hour.  From the surveys, we determined that 
this response time is the same average response time for local law enforcement units. 
 
b. Specialization 
The current trend in many police departments across the United States is 
to organize and train select officers for Special Weapons and Tactics response.  Most of 
these teams are constructed from police officers and sheriff’s deputies that are only 
available to train on a part-time basis.  This mixed conglomerate of police officers that 
perform SWAT missions rarely train, which leads to the sub-optimization of those teams.  
An increase in the potential risks to the officers, innocent civilians, and hostages during 
times of crisis will reduce the chances of a successful outcome for any mission.  This 
situation leaves officers in the unenviable position of skill atrophy when called upon to 
perform a SWAT mission. 
ASOC will combat skill atrophy by continuous training and mission focus.  
ASOC can provide dedicated, mission specific operating teams that will reduce the risk to  
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officers, civilians and hostages through mission specialization.  It will maintain its own 




Standardized operating procedures will reduce variability in the outcome 
of the mission at hand, which will further reduce risk.  ASOC will be able to provide 
expertise in their geographic areas of cognizance.  ASOC SWAT teams will train 
specifically on integration with local law enforcement to ensure maximum 
interoperability.  The ASOC procedures and policies will be established using a mix of 
the best local law enforcement established procedures and integrated military tactics and 
techniques.  Using a private company to negotiate these procedures may eliminate 
problems of political agendas as described in the surveys. 
 
d. New Communications Procedures 
Recent balked attempts at hostage rescue such as the stand-off at 
Columbine High School can be contributed to failures in communication between 
different elements of law enforcement.42 With the advent of new communications 
technology, the ASOC SWAT Initiative could provide the impetus to introduce new 
communications standards and practices throughout the law enforcement and emergency 
response communities.  The Phase 1 coordination team will provide the basis for this 
integrated communication system and should have worked through the communication 
challenges encountered in the municipal and regional law enforcement arenas. 
 
e. Reduced Costs 
The financial chapter shows the cost-effectiveness analysis of the current 
method of providing SWAT capabilities compared to the ASOC SWAT Teams.  This 
                                                 
42 http://montrose.org/org/citizens/may26report.htm 
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analysis determined that ASOC will be able to provide maximum protection and 
capabilities in both urban and rural areas at a greatly reduced cost to tax payers. 
Major metropolitan areas will discover a major cost savings in reduced 
labor, capital and infrastructure costs when they employ ASOC.  Urban areas will be 
provided the same level of protection that the large metropolitan areas will have at a cost 
that is proportionate to their size and affordability.  This economy of scale can only be 
realized through the ASOC Initiative. 
 
C. WEAKNESSES 
1. Phase 1 – Consulting and Coordination 
a. Minimal Law Enforcement Experience 
Law enforcement experience is necessary to gain credence not only with 
the law enforcement agencies that ASOC will be working with, but also gaining 
credibility with the local public.  Having a trained warfare specialist on the staff during 
the first phase will allay most of the fears and concerns of both law enforcement agencies 
and the public.  During later phases, law enforcement experience should not be an issue 
as ASOC will actively recruit top law enforcement officers. 
 
b. Local Politics, Geography and Culture 
Entrenched law enforcement agencies and union representatives would 
certainly balk at the idea of losing jobs to a private firm. Community leaders and private 
citizens may be resistant to having their security needs met by a company that is profit 
driven and whose span of control and responsibility is outlined in specific legal language.  
Also, America’s awareness of domestic security issues is at an all-time high due to the 
media blitz surrounding the attacks on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the 
events that occurred on September 11, 2001. 
Overcoming the culture that has been instilled in both the local population 
and law enforcement agencies concerning the level of service and the expectations of 
public services will play an important role in the initial success of the firm.  The current 
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lack of knowledge with regard to the demographics and distribution of crime in certain 
geographical areas will only be overcome with time, experience, and further study. 
 
2. Phases 2 And 3 - Operations 
a. Additional Level of Coordination 
The current multi-tiered structure of law enforcement produces a set of 
challenges that are not easily overcome.  Determining command and control in crisis 
situations will likely cause conflict and confusion.  As has been noted previously, there is 
also a distinct lack of communications standards and practices among agencies.  Often, 
there are miscommunications between agencies as to the overall commander’s intent that 
can result in catastrophic miscues.  The employment of ASOC will introduce an 
additional level of interagency coordination in times of crisis but will require serious 
contributions of ASOC financial and operational resources. 
 
b. Legal Issues 
Since 9/11, there have been many changes to the legal structure of law 
enforcement particularly with the formation of the Department of Homeland Security.  
Many of the details and ramifications of these changes have not yet been fully developed 
or explored.  The legality of an operation such as ASOC may be in question.  However, 
there are already several instances of private security firms performing operations that 
were once accomplished by public sector employees.  For example, the security 
company, Wackenhut, provides private SWAT teams that protect nuclear weapons 
facilities in Nevada and South Carolina.43 
 
                                                 
43 Singer, P. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.  NY: Cornell University Press. 
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c. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdictional issues will also come into play during many of ASOC’s 
operations.  As with the current law enforcement structure, the nature of the operation 
often dictates just who has authority to conduct the operation.  It is not yet certain if 
ASOC will be given operational control during an incident, or if the company will be 
subjugated to a subordinate role.  The conditions laid out in the contract with a 
municipality will have to cover these jurisdictional issues in accordance with local, state 
and federal laws. 
 
d. Lack of Critical Infrastructure 
As with any new start-up company, there is no critical infrastructure yet in 
place.  Site selection for the different headquarters’ locations will have to be carefully 
considered in order to achieve the operational goals and vision of the company.  Ample 
space for training facilities, berthing for the on-duty officers, and access to an airfield or 
helipad will influence these critical decisions. 
 
e. Cash Flow and Capital Investment 
Initial cash flow for the company will also be an issue. With the proposed 
size of a team to cover Los Angeles in Phase 2 requiring 25 team members, contracts 
must be sufficient to cover salaries, supplies, and equipment.  Covering Southern 
California and Nevada in Phase 3 will require approximately sixty team members and 
more extensive equipment.  Regional contract and capital investment requirements must 
be sufficient to cover these more extensive operating costs.  ASOC must differentiate 
itself from competitors, which will require higher salaries to attract talent and asset 




1. Phase 1 – Consulting and Coordination 
a. Few Competitors 
Currently, there are very few competitors in this new market.  However, in 
the future, a successful company will entice other firms to join the industry.  Expansion 
begets expansion until market saturation is achieved.  The maturation of the industry in 
the United States will likely occur when full coverage of the United States has been 
achieved.  The international industry will continue to fluctuate depending on supply and 
demand.   Interest will be created throughout state and local communities with each 
successful operation conducted.  
 
b. Grant Funds Available 
Federal funds will play a key role in the funding of cities to be able to 
afford ASOC.  ASOC will focus on educating municipal and state decision makers of 
these Department of Homeland Security Grants.  To take full advantage of this potential 
revenue source, ASOC will establish administrative grant experts to complete the 
paperwork for governments at all levels.  ASOC will also send marketing teams to 
potential clients to sell the product by advertising this availability of grant resources.  The 
desired end-state would be that Department of Homeland Security decision makers would 
require local and state governments to utilize ASOC in regards to the Federal anti-
terrorism grants. 
 
c. Low Start-Up Costs 
During the first phase of deployment, total start-up costs will be very low.  
For a start-up consulting firm, all that will be needed is office space, office equipment, 
and clients.  The only labor costs incurred during Phase 1 will be the salaries of the three 
employees that will be a part of the management team. 
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d. Trend toward Privatization and Outsourcing  
Changes in the nature of terrorist threats and security related issues 
coupled with the current wave of privatization and outsourcing of services will play a 
large role in maintaining the health of this industry.44  Advances in communications 
technologies and weapons systems will enable the private security companies to play a 
significant role in the future of crisis operations.  Communities affected by the constant 
threat of terrorist activities will become aware of current law enforcement agencies’ 
limited ability to provide this critical service.  The continued reduction of Federal, State 
and local budgets will place pressure on community leaders to seek the best possible 
solution to meet the growing security threat.  Therefore, the opportunity for a private 
security company to operate within the U. S. is real, and the continuing “trend towards 
worldwide privatization seems to indicate that the marketing of military services will 
continue to be a growth industry for the foreseeable future.”45 
 
2. Phases 2 and 3 - Operations 
a. Need for Swat Capabilities beyond Major Cities 
Most major United States cities and major metropolitan areas already have 
established organic SWAT capabilities.  However, with the on-going war on terrorism, 
all of America is under the potential threat of terrorist attack.  Therefore, an immediate 
need for a networked organization that can provide emergency response, anti-terrorist 
response, special event security and maritime ship boarding exists.  Special response 
units are no longer the purview of densely populated areas.  ASOC is in the position to 
meet the needs of many domestic contingencies. 
 
                                                 
44 Singer, P. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. NY: Cornell University Press. 
45 http://www.accord.org.za/publications/ct6/issue6/issue6.htm 
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b.  Reduction of Sub-Optimization 
Many SWAT teams throughout the United States are still made up of 
officers from different police departments that come together occasionally to train.  This 
leads to sub-optimization of existing law enforcement teams and creates the need for a 
network of centralized, highly specialized SWAT teams whose sole mission is to train 
and conduct SWAT operations.  ASOC teams will create optimal solutions for domestic 
requirements. 
 
c. Trend toward Privatization to Reduce the Size of Government 
Since the early 1950s when President Harry Truman proclaimed, “it is the 
policy of the Government of the United States to rely on commercial sources to supply 
the products and services the government needs… [the government] shall not start or 
carry on any activity to provide a commercial product or service if the product or service 
can be procured more economically from a commercial source” 46  Privatization has been 
one of the many areas of focus to reduce the overall size of government.  
It has become evident that privatization has lead to the better use of 
government resources.  It also fosters innovation and allows the government to utilize 
personnel and skills that are not easily obtained in the public sector.   Many state 
governments and municipalities are also learning that this trend results in the better use of 
scarce budgetary dollars and have begun to outsource many of their core 
responsibilities.47  It is only natural that this trend extends towards the privatization of 
law enforcement responsibilities.  ASOC has identified a market to capitalize upon this 
wave of privatization and outsourcing. 




d. Capital Being Pushed to Local Level for Anti-Terrorism and 
Emergency Response 
After President George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland 
Defense in 2002, Congress began appropriating funds that were to be used at the state and 
local government levels to meet increased security concerns.  
The Office for Domestic Preparedness Funds are awarded to and 
distributed through the State Administrative Agency designated by the Governor of each 
state.48  Total funding provided through the Office for Domestic Preparedness Funds 
alone this award cycle is $2.2 billion.  California was the largest recipient with a total of 
$176,499,000.49  The ASOC Network would help to efficiently utilize those funds 
designated as terrorism prevention. 
 
e. Continued Terror Incidents Overseas and Increased Concerns in 
the United States 
In his speech to the Smithsonian Associates in February 2000, John C. 
Gannon, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council stated, “Globalization will 
provide mankind with the unprecedented opportunity to improve the quality of human 
life across the planet; but progress will be hampered by economic volatility, by the 
political and security implications of sharpening inequalities in income, and by the 
growing threat from multiple, relatively small-scale programs of weapons of mass 
destruction."  He also concluded that terrorists will pose a much greater threat to United 
States Security than they had in the past.50 
The fact that terrorist incidents have been on the rise throughout the world 
and are likely to continue creates an opportunity for private companies such as ASOC to 
participate in the domestic defense of the United States. 





f. Establishment of a Concurrent Overseas Network 
Once a foothold has been established in the local and regional domestic 
market for homeland defense and other related security issues, the next logical step would 
call for expansion. As a potential going concern, the ASOC Initiative has room to grow in 
the national and international market for anti-terrorism protection.  Small, flexible and 
mobile teams could be easily dispatched for small and large-scale protection details.  As 
in the current PMI, ASOC could provide training in SWAT tactics abroad as well as 
serving as a consulting service for foreign governments. 
 
E. THREATS 
1. Phase 1 – Consulting and Coordination 
a. Government Competition 
Competition from other government agencies could stifle the ASOC 
SWAT Initiative.  With the growing emphasis on homeland security needs, government 
agencies that are currently responsible for the coordination of law enforcement activities 
could increase the size of their foothold and push out any unwanted competitors. 
 
b. Local Politics 
Local politics may also be a threat to the newly-formed ASOC.  Civil 
leaders may be reluctant to turn over control of coordination activities especially for a 
volatile issue such as security. Local police unions may lobby against the ASOC 
Initiative based on a misunderstood perception of job threats. 
 
c. Grant Funds 
Grants are available for homeland defense companies to cover start-up and 
sustainment costs.  However, the actions required to secure these funds are not clear at 
this time and may take considerable effort to obtain.  Ensuring that all requirements are 
met to receive the funds may be an obstacle. 
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2. Phases 2 and 3 - Operations 
a. Public Perception 
Among the possible threats to the ASOC Initiative is the public’s 
perception of civilians performing operations normally performed by government and 
other officials.  However, there already is a concern that para-militarization of law 
enforcement officers may send the wrong message to the public about direction of law 
enforcement.51 Aggressive advertisement to diminish public concern may be necessary.  
ASOC will need to focus on marketing a positive image of its role in society to the 
general population. 
 
b. Competition from Established Companies 
PMI companies that already have established contracts for providing 
security internationally have several distinct advantages over ASOC.  The main 
advantage is prior experience and name recognition.  These companies have taken 
advantage of the contingency market available to them to reap huge amounts of revenue 
in a short period of time.52  The low barriers to entry and exit into these markets have 
made it a lucrative industry in the past and may continue to grow in the future.  Due to 
the large revenues generated by overseas contracts, the PMI’s have access to an already 
existing stream of cash flow that, combined with brand recognition, would allow them to 
compete heavily against ASOC for SWAT Initiative contracts and federal grant money. 
 
c. Competition from Existing Swat Teams 
There will also be heavy competition and resistance from departments 
with existing SWAT Teams.  From the survey, we saw a split in the departments that 
would even consider having a multi-jurisdictional team.  Cities with existing 
infrastructure have millions of dollars invested in their SWAT Teams and law 
enforcement departments. While economically, these investments are considered sunk 
                                                 
51 http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v97/n673/a02.html 
52 Singer, P. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. NY: Cornell University Press. 
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costs and should be irrelevant to any future economic decisions, the comfort level of 
protection provided will be hard to overcome in civic leaders and the populace at large.  
Jobs will be at stake and organized union resistance will surely follow any 
call to privatize such a critical function of law enforcement.  Many city managers and 
other leader would rather stay with a known quantity than to try an unknown.  If ASOC 
or any other firm in the industry were to fail to meet its contractual obligations, the city 
would be forced to quickly reassemble its previous infrastructure, which could cost them 
not only political influence, but large dollar amounts from their cities’ budgets. 
 
d. Quantity of Work Will Vary 
The overall quantity of work requiring SWAT involvement will vary 
depending on crime characteristics of individual communities.  Different areas of the 
country will inherently have different amounts of SWAT needs.  Municipalities may not 
wish to invest the money required to perform a cost/benefit analysis of switching to 
ASOC provided SWAT services when they feel that their current law enforcement 
organizations’ level of protection is sufficient to meet their security needs.  
 
e. Principal-Agent Problem 
Combining operations of a private organization, which is driven by 
profitability, with a public organization, which is driven by operational capability, may 
result in the classic principal-agent problem.  Civic leaders, as well as the public, have 
certain ideas as to how, when, where and why resources should be utilized.  A public 
good, such as security protection, must be treated as both non-rivalrous and non-
excludable, meaning that everyone has the right to use these services.  Services should 
not be hoarded by the highest bidder.  However, in the privatized security industry, this 




The purpose of this SWOT analysis was to provide an assessment of the fit 
between the private SWAT market and ASOC.  As discussed, ASOC has many internal 
strengths and weaknesses.  Its strengths, though, outweigh these weaknesses.  These 
strengths consist of substantial savings in both opportunity and financial costs for local 
and state governments.  They also involve the ability to focus and coordinate SWAT 
activities. 
Though the potential weaknesses in a private SWAT company are plentiful, 
ASOC has a plan to counter the weaknesses during each phase.  During the Phase 1 
consulting focus, ASOC can build the necessary relationships and experience levels to 
counter the Phase 2 and 3 politics, marketing, legal, infrastructure, and financial 
weaknesses. 
The opportunities for a private SWAT company are also numerous and far 
outweigh the threats.  The threats discussed above are real but can be countered with 
aggressive marketing campaigns and in-depth planning.  The pivotal strategy to enter the 
market first will allow ASOC to seize the initiative and counter many of the competition 
threats. 
Just as Phase 1 prepares ASOC to deal with its potential Phase 2 and 3 
weaknesses in its internal strength and weakness analysis, the same concept applies to the 
outside opportunity and threat analysis.  By entering the market as a consulting firm, 
ASOC can learn to seize the opportunities and counter the threats imposed on the SWAT 
operational second and third phases.  By learning the SWAT business and developing key 
relationships with SWAT stakeholders in law enforcement and local and state 
governments, ASOC will have the necessary knowledge to understand the politics and 
financial intricacies before it invests in substantial SWAT operational assets. 
Therefore, based upon this SWOT analysis, this team has determined that there is 
an excellent fit between the emerging private SWAT market and all three phases of 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
59 
V. COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
A. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES  
A cost effectiveness analysis is a quantifiable method to determine if ASOC can 
run its business cheaper than the various SWAT organizations in Los Angeles.  This cost 
effectiveness analysis will include a description of a cost effectiveness model from an 
academic viewpoint.  This description of the cost-benefit model will discuss cost-benefit 
analysis, present value, and cost-effectiveness analysis. 
The cost effectiveness discussion will then shift to comparing the costs of the 
ASOC SWAT Initiative to the overall costs of its competitors.  This comparison will first 
address Phase 1 of the ASOC Initiative – the entry consulting communication firm.  It 
will then address Phase 2 – an ASOC SWAT team that provides first response contracts 
to high-risk facilities and events.  It will compare these teams to local Los Angeles and 
federal agency SWAT teams not including LAPD SWAT, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
SWAT, or the Los Angeles FBI Enhancement Team because ASOC does not foresee 
replacing these entrenched SWAT organizations.  Lastly, it will compare the costs of the 
ASOC SWAT Initiative Phase 3 and the local SWAT teams throughout the Los Angeles - 
Las Vegas - San Diego triangle.  The cost comparison will focus on the fiscal and 
opportunity costs but will also consider intangible costs.  Although the intangible costs 
are difficult to quantify, they are important to consider when comparing government and 
privatized SWAT services. 
This cost effectiveness analysis will close with the final results of the cost 
effectiveness comparison and the implications of the final result.  This final result will let 
the reader know if the ASOC SWAT Initiative can accomplish its mission cheaper than 
the public SWAT teams and how much cheaper.  It will also provide a valuable 
quantifiable resource to share with potential investors and with banks when applying for 
business loans.  The implications of this analysis are far-reaching for municipal police 
department budgets, Department of Homeland Security contracting, federal agency 
SWAT teams, and United States taxpayers. 
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B. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS MODEL 
An effective method to determine if a project is worthwhile is to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis of the project.  According to Harvey S. Rosen, a Princeton Economics 
Professor currently working as an economic advisor to President Bush, a cost-benefit 
analysis is “a set of systematic procedures for valuing…commodities, which allows 
policy analysts to determine whether a project is, on balance, beneficial.”53 
When comparing two mutually exclusive projects, there are three generally 
accepted methods of comparison.  They are the present value comparison, the internal 
rate of return, and the cost/benefit ratio. 
 
1. Present Value 
The present value method compares different costs and benefits from different 
time periods.  It compares these values using present values.  It allows comparison of 
fiscal values from different years by converting the values into a certain year’s dollars 
taking into account the projected interest that could be earned on these dollars.  This 
comparison can either be with dollars from the past or dollars in the future.  The formula 
to determine a present value of dollars is: 









0 L  54 
When comparing values from two mutually exclusive projects, the value with the 
higher present value is the better choice. 
 
2. Internal Rate of Return and Cost-Benefit Ratio 
The other two methods of comparison in cost-benefit analysis are internal rate of 
return and the cost/benefit ratio.  “The internal rate of return is the discount rate that 
would make the present value of the project just equal to zero.” 55  Thus, the internal rate 
                                                 
53 Rosen, Harvey S. (2004) Public Finance (6th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
54 Rosen, Harvey S. (2004) Public Finance (6th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
55 Rosen, Harvey S. (2004) Public Finance (6th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
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of return gives a point of comparison between two projects.  The benefit/cost ratio 
compares the benefits to the costs of a project by analyzing their ratio.  A ratio of greater 
than 1 means the project is worthwhile.   
The problem with these two cost-benefit methods is that they create problems 
when comparing two different projects.  The internal rate of return and the benefit/cost 
ratio create problems when two different projects have different scales.  The benefit/cost 
ratio also is not the best method to use because an analyst can easily manipulate it using 
negative costs and benefits.  As Rosen states, “We conclude that the internal rate of 
return and the benefit-cost ratio can lead to incorrect inferences.  The present value 
criterion is the most reliable guide.”56 
Therefore, because the present value method is not affected by scale problems and 
cannot be manipulated, this research team will use this method for analysis of ASOC 
SWAT Initiative and local SWAT organizations. 
 
3. Discount Rate 
The research team for this project needed to set a discount rate to use in 
calculating the present value for both projects.  A discount rate takes into account the 
time-value of money.  “A dollar in the future is worth less than a dollar today and must 
be “discounted” by an amount that depends on the interest rate and when the money is 
receivable.”57  Thus, for this project, the team used a discount rate of 1.6 percent for 
present value calculations, primarily to calculate the cost of the Las Vegas SWAT team 
over 3 years.  They determined this discount rate using the Office of Management and 
Budget’s 3-year recommended real interest rates on treasury notes and bonds of specified 
maturities.58 
                                                 
56 Rosen, Harvey S. (2004) Public Finance (6th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
57 Rosen, Harvey S. (2004) Public Finance (6th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
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C. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
At times, a comparison of projects does not perfectly fit the benefit-cost analysis 
model.  If two projects have either “the same annual benefits expressed in monetary 
terms” or have “the same annual benefits, but dollar benefits values cannot be assigned to 
their benefits”, then an analyst can use a cost-effectiveness analysis.59  Because of the 
inaccuracy of assigning dollar values to the benefits of both the ASOC SWAT Initiative 
and local SWAT teams, the research team will assume that the monetary values of the 
benefits of the two alternatives are approximately equal.  Thus, they will conduct a cost-




This cost effectiveness analysis will begin with an in-depth look at the total costs 
of ASOC and government SWAT teams.  It will then compare the present values of these 
costs to determine which organization contributes the greatest net benefit to society. 
 
E. GOVERNMENT SWAT COSTS 
1. Phase 1 – Los Angeles Swat Coordination Companies 
ASOC will not compare the costs of its initial entry consulting coordination 
business because there is no comparable competitor in the Los Angeles area.  As stated 
earlier, the closest competitor is the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group, and 
this group consists mainly of representatives from the various SWAT units.  Thus, the 
costs associated with this Warning Group are already included in the costs of the SWAT 
teams. 
 
2. Phase 2 – Los Angeles Local and Federal Agency Overlap SWAT 
Teams 
As discussed in the marketing analysis, the total cost of the overlap SWAT teams 
in the Los Angeles area that ASOC aims to replace is $10,800,000. 
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3. Phase 3 - Regional Government Swat Teams  
The research team organized the regional government SWAT teams into 3 
metropolitan areas – Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and San Diego.   
 
a. Las Vegas 
The budget office from the Las Vegas budget office provided a detailed 
breakdown of the costs for the city SWAT team.  They included three years of budget 
information - 2002-2003, 2003-2004, and 2004-2005.  Their budget information included 
their total direct costs.  These total direct costs consisted of supply/service request 
money, capital requests, and salary/benefits for the team. (See Appendix G) 
To translate the total direct costs to usable data, the team converted the 
past year costs to 2004 dollars using a discount rate of 1.6 percent.  They then took the 
average of the three years’ costs.  The final annual total cost for the Las Vegas SWAT 
team was $4,924,638. (See Appendix F) 
 
b. Los Angeles 
As discussed in the marketing analysis, the total cost of the overlap SWAT 
teams in the Los Angeles area that ASOC is aiming to replace is $10,800,000. 
 
c. San Diego 
The San Diego Police Department budget office provided limited 
information concerning the San Diego SWAT Team.  Based on an interview with one of 
the budget analysts, the San Diego SWAT team does “not have their own budget 
independent of the [overall Police] Department budget.”60  The budget analyst said that 
“this allow[s] the flexibility to address all critical needs” in the overall police department.  
She did share that SWAT receives .72 percent of the 2005 San Diego Police Department 
budget.  Thus, the research team used this figure as the basis for the total cost of the San 
                                                 
60 Personal Interview: LAPD Budget Officer 
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Diego SWAT team.  The overall police department budget for FY 2005 is $309,804,199.  
By multiplying this number by .72 percent, ASOC determined the total cost of the San 
Diego SWAT team to be $2,230,590. (See Appendix F) 
 
F. TOTAL REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL SWAT COSTS 
The total SWAT costs for Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and San Diego is 
$17,955,228.  ASOC’s team will use this value as the present value of these costs.  This 
analysis will compare this value to the costs of the third phase ASOC SWAT Initiative. 
 
G. ASOC SWAT INITIATIVE 
The analysis of the costs for ASOC consists of three categories.  The first is the 
salaries of the employees.  The second is the capital costs.  The third is supplies and 
services costs. 
 
1. Phase 1 – ASOC Consulting Coordination Firm Costs 
The start-up costs for the Phase 1 ASOC Consulting Coordination Firm are 
minimal.  This firm requires only 3 personnel.  The only other costs consist of the 
conservative operating overhead and the initial investment for the communication 
equipment.   
 
a. Salaries of the Employees 
The three employees will receive an initial salary of $100,000.  Thus, the 
total salary costs will be $300,000. 
 
b. Capital Costs 
The initial capital costs will be minimal.  The employees will use their 
personal vehicles, their personal weapons, and their own gear.  The only substantial costs 
will be the communication equipment for coordinating Los Angeles SWAT teams.  This 
initial start-up cost for communication gear is estimated to cost $250,000. 
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c. Supply and Service Costs 
The supply service costs consist primarily of setting-up and running an 
office.  The initial start-up cost will be $20,000 in office equipment.  The monthly rental 
cost will be $3000 for a small office in Los Angeles.  Thus, the supply service costs for 
the year will equal $56,000. 
 
d. Total Phase 1 Start-Up Costs 
The total costs for the first year of Phase 1 are $606,000 for ASOC.  
 
2. Phase 2 – ASOC First Response High-Risk Facility Swat Costs 
a. Salaries of the Employees 
The salaries of the employees for ASOC are based upon the Los Angeles 
Police Department salaries.  ASOC then added 10 percent to these salaries in order to 
create an incentive for talented officers to apply for jobs with ASOC.  They are:  
Lieutenant (LT) = $118,338, Sergeant (SGT) = $100,449, Officer = $87,573, 
Administrator = $77,756.  ASOC plans to employ 1 LT, 3 SGTs, 21 Officers, and 1 
administrator.  Thus, the total salary costs for ASOC are $2,336,474. 
 
b. Capital Costs 
The capital costs for the company consist of replacement vehicles and 
new/replacement equipment costs.  ASOC is forecasting a 4-year-life for its vehicles due 
to regular use.  Thus, it plans to buy one new regular suburban costing $50,000 every two 
years.  It plans to spend $20,000 replacing parts to weapons and wearable gear such as 
ropes and uniforms.  Its total budgeted annual capital costs are $70,000. 
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c. Supply and Service Costs 
The supply/service costs consist of a myriad of different expenses for 
ASOC.  The company organized these requests similarly to the Las Vegas Police 
Department, primarily because they are concerned with maintaining good accountability 
of their expenses.  They range from minimal costs such as groceries ($2500/year) to 
substantial costs such as ammunition ($40,000).  ASOC forecasted use of these various 
services and supplies based on an aggressive training plan and private military company 
experiences. 
Some of the substantial supply/service costs are the helicopter lease, 
helicopter maintenance, and helicopter fuel annual costs of $518,170.  These maintenance 
costs are based on operating costs of $582/hour and approximately 500 hours of flying 
each year.  The helicopter fuel costs are based on 113 gallons of fuel per hour at $2.25 
per gallon and 500 annual flying hours. 
Additional costs of note are operating supplies ($50,000/year), vehicle 
maintenance ($50,000/year), travel/transportation ($25,000/year), and ammunition 
($40,000/year).  The operating supplies will coordinate with the capital equipment cost 
budget to ensure the teams have the necessary supplies to successfully conduct 
operations.  These supplies are primarily for SWAT operational supplies.  The vehicle 
maintenance budget also provides a robust budget to maintain the vehicles and provides a 
buffer for especially rough use of the vehicles during real-world missions.  ASOC plans 
to have several older vehicles for training, so these maintenance costs should be reserved 
primarily for the suburbans. 
The travel/transportation budget primarily goes for costs associated with 
integrated training with local law enforcement and real missions.  It also applies to 
business travel where ASOC leadership travels to city governments around the region to 
market ASOC’s services. 
Lastly, ASOC predicts expending thousands of rounds of ammunition in 
training.  Focused target training should prevent inordinate firing of rounds during 
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operations and save lives of team members and civilians.  Hence, the supply/service 
budget is $825,170 per year. 
 
d. Total ASOC Direct Cost  
After adding the salaries, capital costs, and supply/service costs, the total 
direct costs for Phase 2 ASOC are $3,231,644 per year.  This total direct cost is the 
present value of the Phase 2 ASOC SWAT Initiative costs. (See Appendix D) 
 
3. Phase 3 – ASOC Regional Swat Costs 
a. Salaries of the Employees 
The salaries of the employees for Phase 3 are the same as for Phase 2.  
ASOC plans to employ 4 Lieutenants, 18 Sergeants, 38 Officers, and 1 administrator.  
Thus, the total salary costs for ASOC are $5,686,964. 
 
b. Capital Costs 
The capital costs for the company consist of replacement vehicles and 
new/replacement equipment costs.  ASOC is forecasting a 4-year-life for its vehicles due 
to regular use.  Thus, it plans to buy one new armored suburban costing $100,000 and 
one new regular suburban costing $50,000 each year.  It plans to spend $20,000 replacing 
parts to weapons and wearable gear such as ropes and uniforms.  Its total budgeted annual 
capital costs are $170,000. 
 
c. Supply and Service Costs 
The supply/service costs consist of a myriad of different expenses for 
ASOC.  The company organized these requests similarly to the Las Vegas Police 
Department, primarily because they are concerned with maintaining good accountability 
of their expenses.  They range from minimal costs such as groceries ($2500/year) to 
substantial costs such as ammunition ($75,000). 
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Some of the substantial supply/service costs are the helicopter lease, 
helicopter maintenance, and helicopter fuel costs of $1,554,510 for three helicopters.  
These maintenance costs are based on the same helicopter operating costs discussed in 
Phase 2.   
Some of the substantial supply/service costs are operating supplies 
($50,000/year), vehicle maintenance ($50,000/year), travel/transportation ($50,000/year), 
and ammunition ($75,000/year).  These supply/service costs mirror the supply/service 
costs for Phase 2 but reflect a larger team of 61 employees.  Hence, the supply/service 
budget is $1,996,510 per year. 
 
d. Total ASOC Direct Costs 
After adding the salaries, capital costs, and supply/service costs, the total 
direct costs for Phase 3 ASOC are $7,853,474 per year.  This total direct cost is the 
present value of the Phase 3 ASOC SWAT Initiative costs. (See Appendix E) 
 
H. FINAL RESULTS OF COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
1. Phase 2 
Phase 2 Cost Effectiveness Summary Costs 
LA Local & Federal Agency Overlap 
Teams $10,800,000 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT SWAT COSTS $10,800,000 
    
ASOC Costs $3,231,644 
Table 1.   PHASE 2 COST EFFECTIVENESS SUMMARY 
 
This cost effectiveness analysis has focused primarily on fiscal costs.  The fiscal 
cost analysis found that the total annual local and federal overlap SWAT costs were 
$10,800,000.  This analysis found that the total annual ASOC Initiative costs for Phase 2 
were $3,231,644. 
Thus, ASOC SWAT Initiative is more cost effective than local SWAT teams 
because its present value is $7,568,356 less per year for the local governments in the 
region.  
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2. Phase 3 
Phase 3 Cost Effectiveness Summary Costs 
Las Vegas SWAT $4,924,638 
LA Local & Federal Agency Overlap 
Teams $10,800,000 
San Diego SWAT $2,230,590 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT SWAT COSTS $17,955,228 
    
ASOC Costs $7,853,474 
Table 2.   PHASE 3 COST EFFECTIVENESS SUMMARY 
 
The fiscal cost effectiveness analysis for Phase 3 found that the total annual 
regional SWAT costs were $17,955,228 for the Las Vegas, Los Angeles local and federal 
overlap, and San Diego SWAT.  This analysis found that the total annual ASOC Initiative 
costs for Phase 3 were $7,853,474.  Thus ASOC SWAT Initiative is much more cost 
effective than regional SWAT teams because its present value is $10,101,754 less per 
year for the local government in the region. 
 
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
The implications of this cost-effectiveness analysis are numerous for both Phase 2 
and Phase 3 of ASOC Initiative.  First, local governments can save valuable monetary 
resources that they can apply to other programs in their police departments or other 
municipal programs.  These savings have both fiscal and political implications.  The 
fiscal implications are obvious and amount to thousands of dollars for the small city 
police departments and to millions of dollars for the large city police departments.  The 
political implications apply to both city groupings.  The citizens will likely feel safer if 
they understand the advantages of having specialized SWAT capabilities in their local 
area.  They also should see the benefits of the redirected money in better police 
enforcement or other municipal improvement programs. 
The recent influx of money to the Department of Homeland Security also 
provides an interesting implication for local governments.  The FY 2004 Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (UASI) Grant Program opens numerous doors for possible federal 
funding of ASOC SWAT services.  “This program provides financial assistance to 
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address the unique planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs of large urban areas, 
and to assist them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, respond 
to, and recover from threats or acts of terrorism.”61 
This grant program is but one of numerous other opportunities for local 
governments to fund their SWAT needs through ASOC and redirect their money to other 
resources.  ASOC SWAT Initiative is a win-win situation.  With the large focus on 
homeland defense, the Department of Homeland Security will likely receive billions of 
dollars in the next few years from Emergency Response Funds and Congressional 
Supplementals.  ASOC’s mission is to defend citizens in high-risk situations, which 
coincides with Congressional direction for homeland security funds.   
Just as privatized military organizations have received federal contract money, 
local governments will also receive money for local homeland security that they can use 
to contract SWAT services.  Based on this cost-effectiveness analysis, ASOC SWAT 
Initiatives should have a market for its services for years to come, especially when it 
saves police departments millions of dollars each year. 
 
                                                 
61 http://www.ofp.usdoj.gov/odp/grants_programs.htm 
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VI. IS ASOC WORTH DOING? (FINANCIAL ANALYSIS) 
A. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on future financial predictions for ASOC SWAT 
Initiative. The purpose of these predictions is to give the company leadership information 
concerning future financial strengths and weaknesses in the company.  It also provides 
quantifiable numbers to present to investors, banks, and employees as the company looks 
to borrow money, seek investment money, and hire tentative employees.  Most 
importantly, these financial forecasts allow ASOC to determine if it can make money and 
survive the tough beginning years that the majority of businesses experience. 
The financial analysis will address an optimistic scenario where ASOC has strong 
initial revenue and customers pay cash up-front for services.  It will then address a worst-
case scenario in which revenue is not initially consistent and demand for privatized 
SWAT capabilities is not initially strong.  The analysis will address the assumptions for 
each scenario and will then analyze possibilities for overcoming initial problems as 
ASOC moves between its strategic phases.  
 
B. OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
The optimistic scenario involves successful moves into each phase of the business 
strategy where initial revenue and cash flow are large enough to cover costs.  These 
strong beginning revenues and cash flows yield an initial positive net income. 
 
C. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS – OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
To determine the financial data for the Pro Forma Statements for the optimistic 
scenario, the research team made numerous assumptions based on both known data and 
unknown data.  This section will explain those assumptions in-depth.  For all phases, 




1. Phase 1 – Consulting Phase Assumptions 
a. Income Statement Assumptions 
• Sales Revenue – The sales revenue is based on a set contract with 
various law enforcement agencies.  After an initial sales focus by 
ASOC, 30 local police departments in the Los Angeles area will 
pay $10,000 per year for SWAT coordination and communication 
services.  The six Federal Agencies will each pay $20,000 per year 
for the same services.  The LAPD and LAPD Sheriff’s Department 
will each pay $20,000 per year for services.  ASOC will increase 
these prices 3 percent per year to account for inflation and rising 
costs.  These costs are based on the predicted market and the costs 
of running the company.  Since there is no competitor, ASOC will 
be the first to establish market prices and will not have to compete 
initially for business.  Depending on participating law enforcement 
agencies, the prices would have to be adjusted to cover costs. (See 
Appendix H) 
• Expenses – For its forecasted expenses, ASOC assumed that all 
expenses increase by 3 percent per year for the first 5 years except 
for payments on equipment and facilities.  It also assumes that 
start-up costs are included in expenses.  For the $250,000 
communication equipment purchase, ASOC used a 10 percent 
interest rate on a 5-year loan.  They based this assumption on the 
Santa Cruz Community Credit Union Business Equipment Loan 
rate.62  The yearly notes payable were calculated using present 
value formulas assuming yearly payments.  The payments on 
facilities consist of the $36,000 yearly rental expense for the office.  
The capital expense for the first year consists of the initial cost for 
office equipment and furniture.  For Phase 1, there are no capital 
                                                 
62 http://www.scruzccu.org/rates/business-english.shtml 
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expenses following this initial first year cost.  The personnel costs 
consist of $100,000 yearly salary for each of the three employees.  
These salaries include a conservative 3 percent per year pay 
increase for the employees.  There are no supply/services expenses 
for this phase.  The income taxes payable assumes a 34 percent 
federal corporate tax rate.  The California state corporate tax rate is 
a flat tax rate of 8.84 percent.63  ASOC assumes that they will pay 
all of these costs at the beginning of the fiscal year when they 
receive the contract money from the police stations.  
 
b. Cash Flow Assumptions 
• ASOC’s cash flow statement assumes that the local 
governments/law enforcement agencies will pay their yearly 
contract fees at the beginning of the year in cash.   
• ASOC assumes that operating expenses include all expenses 
except for the payments on equipment and facilities. 
• ASOC assumes that it will pay its expenses the same year. 
• ASOC does not include interest income or interest expenses in its 
operating activities. 
• ASOC includes income taxes in its operating cash outflows. 
• ASOC assumes that there is no cash flow from financing activities 
since it is a private company.  It does not sell short-term 
investments, issue common stock, or buy back stocks.  It also does 
not pay cash dividends to employees or owners of the company. 
• All the values on the cash flow statement use the same 
assumptions as stated in the income statement assumptions. 




2. Phase 2 – Los Angeles Operational Swat Team Assumptions 
a. Income Sheet Assumptions 
• Sales Revenue – ASOC’s sales revenue comes primarily from 
contracts with local police departments.  It assumes that 50 percent 
of the Los Angeles small SWAT teams and 50 percent of the Los 
Angeles federal agency SWAT teams will hire ASOC to either 
augment or replace their own internal SWAT teams.  ASOC also 
assumes that it will not replace LAPD SWAT, Los Angeles 
County Sheriff SWAT, or the Los Angeles-based FBI 
Enhancement Team because of their entrenched status in the Los 
Angeles area.  The fee that ASOC will charge each small-city 
government for its SWAT services is $50,000 per year, which 
totals $750,000 of revenue per year for 15 cities.  ASOC will 
charge $4.5M for the 6 federal agency SWAT teams based upon 
assumed costs for their teams.  These fees are based upon the 
researched costs to taxpayers of funding these SWAT teams.  
Thus, total revenue for ASOC will initially be $5,250,000.  ASOC 
will raise fees by 3 percent each year to account for inflation.  (See 
Appendix I) 
• Expenses – For its forecasted expenses, ASOC assumed that all 
expenses increase by 3 percent per year except for payments on 
equipment and facilities, and depreciation expense.  Initial start-up 
costs for equipment will be $609,650.  The interest rates for this 
equipment purchase are the same as described in Phase 1.  Based 
on these interest rates, the yearly note payments will be $160,824 
for a 5-year note.  For the mortgage payment on the facilities, 
ASOC assumes a 6.25 percent interest rate on a 10-year loan based 
upon quotes for similar interest rates of similar loans.  ASOC used 
the Wells-Fargo bank’s terms, which state that a Small Business 
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Administration (SBA) loan with terms greater than 7 years uses the 
New York Prime Rate plus 2.75 percent.  They used a prime rate 
of 4.75 percent.64  Thus, the start-up facility mortgage for 
$1,500,000 facility costs will have yearly payments of $206,223.  
The capital expenses of $70,000 per year primarily consist of 
annual replacement vehicle and equipment costs.  The 
supply/services expenses are based on forecasted operating costs.  
Personnel expenses are based on LAPD SWAT salaries plus 10 
percent.  The depreciation expenses come from the summation of 
the yearly accumulated depreciation of the equipment and the 
facilities.  The depreciation expense is found by subtracting the 
salvage value from the cost of the item and then dividing by the 
useful life.65  The assumed salvage value for the facility is $1M 
and the assumed useful life is 20 years.  The assumed salvage 
value for the equipment is $200,000, and the assumed useful life 
for the equipment is 5 years.  The income taxes are based on the 
same assumptions as discussed for Phase 1 – 34 percent federal 
corporate tax and 8.84 percent California flat corporate tax rate. 
 





b. Cash Flow Assumptions 
• ASOC’s cash flow statement for Phase 2 makes the same 
assumptions for Phase 2 as it did for Phase 1.   
 
3. Phase 3 – Regional Operational Swat Teams Assumptions 
a. Income Sheet Assumptions 
• Sales Revenue – ASOC’s sales revenue for Phase 3 comes 
primarily from contracts with police departments and federal 
agencies.  The southern California regional focus, though, also 
includes revenue from San Diego and Las Vegas police 
departments for SWAT services.  Thus, the sales revenue for Phase 
3 uses the same numbers and assumptions as Phase 2 for the Los 
Angeles area and adds the regional revenue for the San Diego and 
Las Vegas areas.  ASOC derived the costs for the San Diego and 
Las Vegas services from the researched budgets for their SWAT 
teams.  The optimistic forecast for the Phase 3 contracts assumes 
that revenue comes at the beginning of each year of services.  The 
awarding of this money at the front end of the year helps with 
covering the costs throughout the year.  ASOC also assumed that 
revenues will grow by 3 percent each year to cover inflation.  This 
growth will result from increases in fees for the various contracts 
with local and federal agencies. 
• Expenses – For its forecasted expenses, ASOC assumed that all 
expenses increase by 3 percent per year except for payments on 
equipment and facilities, and depreciation expense.  The payments 
on equipment and facilities assume the same loan types as Phase 2 
but increase the amounts invested in facilities and equipment due 
to mission and personnel expansion.  The capital expenses, 
supply/services expenses, and personnel expenses also increase 
due to the necessity of more resources to cover a significantly 
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larger sector and to the increase in personnel from 26 to 61.  ASOC 
calculated the depreciation expenses the same as for Phase 2 
except that it assumed a salvage value of $500,000 for equipment 
and $1.5M for the facilities.  The costs for the facilities and 
equipment increased but the useful lives stayed the same.  The 
income taxes are based on the same assumptions as the balance 
sheet – 34 percent federal corporate tax and 8.84 percent California 
flat corporate tax rate. 
 
b. Cash Flow Assumptions 
• ASOC’s cash flow statement for Phase 3 makes the same 
assumptions as it did for Phase 1 and 2.   
 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
The financial analysis for this first scenario, the optimistic scenario, allows ASOC 
to forecast possible strengths and weaknesses of the 3 phases of the ASOC SWAT 
Initiative.  They are not complete and are based on numerous dynamic assumptions that 
can change daily.  They do give valuable information for analysis of profitability and 
cash-flow.   
 
1. Profitability 
The profitability of ASOC for this scenario rests on the assumption that local 
police departments and federal agencies in Los Angeles and the region will want to 
contract ASOC to use their services.  Because the contracts call for money paid up-front 
in this scenario, ASOC will have revenues at the beginning of each phase to cover costs 




  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Phase 1 4.7% 7.5% 7.7% 7.9% 8.1% 
Phase 2 17.4% 17.5% 17.7% 17.8% 17.9% 
Phase 3 14.3% 14.5% 14.7% 14.9% 15.1% 
Table 3.   PROFIT MARGIN – OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
 
In this scenario, ASOC will earn profit from the start, and the profits will increase 
steadily during each phase. 
 
2. Cash Flow Analysis 
The contract agreements in the optimistic scenario will require customers to pay 
at the beginning of the year for ASOC services.  This contract agreement will lead to 
positive cash flow for ASOC, which will allow them to pay operating expenses as they 
arise.  This positive cash flow will prevent ASOC from having to seek cash to cover 
expenses from banks or outside investors.  The cash flows for each year are summarized 
in the following table. 
 
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Phase 1 $21,750 $35,308 $37,498 $39,754 $42,078 
Phase 2 $913,633 $948,244 $983,893 $1,020,612 $1,058,432 
Phase 3 $1,779,860 $1,857,913 $1,938,308 $2,021,115 $2,106,406 
Table 4.   CASH FLOW BY YEAR – OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
 
Thus, the optimist scenario demonstrates that ASOC will be able to operate with a 
positive cash flow from the start.  This scenario also demonstrates that ASOC will have 
cash to invest in assets and smoothly progress to the next phase of the business strategy.   
If ASOC is able to market their service and secure contracts with law enforcement 
departments and federal agencies based on the assumptions for each phase discussed in 
this section, their future looks bright. 
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3. Optimistic Scenario Conclusion 
Based on market research, ASOC has identified a need for their service.  This 
scenario may be optimistic, though, because it assumes 100 percent participation in the 
Los Angeles area for Phase 1, 50 percent participation in the Los Angeles area for Phase 
2, and 100 percent participation of the regional city SWAT teams in Las Vegas and San 
Diego in Phase 3.  Because of the assumed initial success in marketing and selling 
ASOC’s product, this scenario explains away much of the difficult transition between 
phases by assuming contracts in which money is paid at the beginning of the year, and 
police departments are clamoring for ASOC’s services.  Even if ASOC is relatively 
confident in the value of their services and the demand for their services, it is important 
to consider a worst-case scenario where everyone is not clamoring for privatized SWAT 
services and revenue, and cash is not flowing into the company.  Thus, it is necessary to 
consider the implications of a worst-case scenario for ASOC financial forecasting and 
ASOC’s overall business strategy. 
 
E. WORST-CASE SCENARIO 
ASOC must be prepared to react to low demand for their product and any cash 
flow problems resulting from low revenues.  The most dangerous periods in the 
company’s business strategy are not during the different phases but in the movement 
between the phases.  It is during this uncertain time period between the phases where 
ASOC will need to invest money in expensive assets such as new facilities and additional 
helicopter and vehicle support.  As they attempt to move into new markets, the company 
must also determine how it will gain enough cash to continue to pay its increasing 
operating expenses.   
In order to meet its forecasted expenses, ASOC needs to determine the break-even 
point to cover its expected costs for each phase.  This break-even point will allow ASOC 
to determine how much it should minimize costs and creatively acquire cash to keep the 
business functioning. 
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The other important task is to determine the worst-case scenario for each phase.  
For planning purposes, ASOC will describe the worst-case scenario for the transition 
from Phase 1 to Phase 2 as the following; as ASOC makes the transition from Phase 1 to 
Phase 2, it will have only one Los Angeles local police department contract, and it can 
only expect slow growth in the contracts at the rate of 5 cities per six months.  This 
delayed growth will be due to the local police departments’ desire to see if the company 
will succeed in providing an effective and safe SWAT service.  Thus, ASOC must be 
creative in planning for this worst-case possibility. 
A similar worst-case scenario applies to the move from Phase 2 to Phase 3.  This 
worst-case scenario involves Las Vegas and San Diego hesitancy to contract fully for 
ASOC SWAT services.  This hesitancy will be due to the municipal difficulties in 
securing public funds and concerns with hiring privatized SWAT services. 
 
F. STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING WORST-CASE SCENARIO 
CHALLENGES 
1. Break-Even Amounts 
For each phase in the worst-case scenario, there is a break-even point.  This 
break-even point is the amount of revenues ASOC must earn to meet its total expenses.  
As soon as ASOC brings in more revenues than expenses, it will make a profit.  For this 
analysis, ASOC will determine its break-even point in pre-tax dollars. 
For Phase 1, ASOC must earn revenues of $421,949 to surpass its expenses using 
the assumptions for the optimistic scenario. For Phase 2, ASOC’s break-even point is 
$3,651,621.  For Phase 3, ASOC must earn $9,291,408. (See Appendices H, I, J)  As 
discussed, this break-even point uses the same assumptions as the optimistic scenario.  
All of these break-even points are substantial and increase dramatically between phases.  
Given the worst-case scenario of only one police department contracting ASOC’s SWAT 
services, ASOC must be creative and identify strategies of how it will find cash to 




These strategies for increasing revenue and cash-flow apply principles that 
primarily focused on the transition from Phase 1 – the communication consulting phase 
to Phase 2 – the operational SWAT phase.  This strategic analysis does not focus on cash-
flow strategies for start-up costs of Phase 1 because ASOC can survive with a much 
lower revenue if the 3 consultants take dramatic cuts in pay, and the company is creative 
in acquiring communication equipment.  It also does not focus heavily on the transition to 
Phase 3 because ASOC will have a solid infrastructure established in Phase 2 and can 
apply the same principles described for Phase 2 to the transition to Phase 3. 
 
3. Short-Term Focus on Small Niche Swat Market 
The first strategy for ASOC to successfully survive the transition from Phase 1 to 
Phase 2 is to focus on the small niche market of contracted SWAT security services for 
private companies and special events.  This niche market strategy’s advantage would be 
ease of entry into the market.  ASOC could enter this market with limited resources, 
smaller teams, and lower costs than its Phase 2 goal of contracting with numerous local 
police departments and federal agencies.  This strategy, though, would have the 
disadvantage of numerous established players including local police SWAT teams, 
federal agency SWAT teams, and private security firms that provide quality SWAT 
protection for businesses.   The niche market of private security for companies, though, 
would still potentially provide valuable operating cash to keep ASOC in business as it 
transitions from consulting to operational services.  ASOC would focus on providing 
SWAT capability to the security already in place at both businesses and special events.  
In the LA area, there are numerous businesses and potential terrorist targets that ASOC 
could provide services. 
 
a. Theme Parks 
First, ASOC could contract with the various theme parks in the Los 
Angeles area for SWAT teams to react to terrorist threats and actions.  Los Angeles has 
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numerous theme parks primarily in the Anaheim area including Disney and Universal 
Studios.  In the San Fernando Valley in northern Los Angeles, there also is Magic 
Mountain, which is a large amusement park.  These parks are high-risk terrorist targets 
due to the number of people passing through them each year.  These companies, 
especially Disney, have billions of dollars in revenue each year and can afford to pay 
ASOC for its services. 
 
b. Movie Industry 
Another niche market would be to provide reaction security for the movie 
industry.  ASOC could focus on special events such as the various award evenings.  
Another potential market is the security for the studios during filming of movies or on 
station in dangerous filming locations.  The movie studios also have disposable income 
and would likely be willing to pay for specialized security to protect its investments.  
Another emerging market is private security for movie stars and high-profile musicians.  
Some of these celebrities feel they need specialized security or simply desire to create the 
perception that they can afford specialized security. 
 
c. Sporting Events 
Sporting Events also are potential business for ASOC.  In Los Angeles, 
there are multiple professional teams, college teams, and various other sporting events.  
Los Angeles has numerous major venues for these high-visibility events – the Staple 
Center, the Rose Bowl, the Dodger’s stadium, the Anaheim Angels stadium, and various 
other venues.  Professional and college-level athletic teams have disposable cash and 
would be willing to pay for specialized security services, especially during high-visibility 
events. 
 
d. Private Companies 
In Los Angeles, there are numerous large companies that ASOC could 
pursue for business.  One example would be Bank of America, which has numerous 
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locations in the Los Angeles area.  In the Los Angeles and Anaheim area alone, there are 
over 50 banking centers that provide service for customers.66  Bank of America is a likely 
target for various types of crime and would likely pay for dedicated SWAT capabilities.  
These types of companies have resources and would have the potential to sign significant 
multi-year contracts with ASOC for SWAT services.  They also are probable targets for 
various criminals.  This type of contract would provide focused revenues for ASOC with 
few expenses as ASOC attempts to expand its contracts with local police departments. 
 
e. Public Office Buildings 
Another source of revenue would be the various political buildings in Los 
Angeles including the local, state, and federal government offices, all of which are 
probable targets for terrorists.  This market would be more difficult, though, because it 
involves public money.  Thus, the contracts could take time to develop, which would lead 
to the same problems with the local police departments and federal agencies that cause 
the cash flow problem as ASOC transitions between Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
 
f. Catastrophic Terrorist Targets 
Lastly, a large potential market for ASOC is potential catastrophic terrorist 
targets.  These targets consist of nuclear power plants, ports, dams, and chemical plants.  
A terrorist attack at any of these sites could cause catastrophic damage to Los Angeles 
citizens and commerce.  Thus, these potential targets represent a focused, niche market 
that ASOC could provide contracted security services for at a fair price. 
All of these small niche markets currently have protection from the 
various Los Angeles and federal SWAT teams that provide SWAT capabilities.  ASOC’s 
market would be to provide fairly priced, focused, highly competent SWAT teams to 
cover special events and high threat time periods when the other security forces are 
disbursed or busy.  This type of service would provide precious cash for ASOC as they 
continue building their customer base with law enforcement agencies.  These types of 
                                                 
66 http://bankofamerica.via.infonow.net/locator/atmbranch/jsp/index.jsp 
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contracts in small niche markets are one strategy that would keep ASOC functioning as it 
transitions from Phase 1 to Phase 2 and Phase 2 to Phase 3.  Depending on the success 
and profitability of these ventures, ASOC could also develop another steady source of 
income other than public SWAT contracts.   
 
4. Sub-Contract with Private Defense Contractors 
The niche strategy focuses on methods to gain revenue in smaller, private markets 
rather than local police departments and federal agencies.  Another strategy for making 
the transition between Phase 1 and Phase 2 is to sub-contract with established private 
defense contractors.  These established private defense companies have resources that 
they could invest in ASOC to help it make the transition from a communication 
consulting firm to an operational private SWAT organization. 
There are numerous strengths that private defense contractors could offer ASOC.  
First, they have a much larger base of cash that they could invest in ASOC during its 
initial transition to SWAT operations.  This cash would allow ASOC to focus on its 
vision of replacing the network of small Los Angeles SWAT teams. It would allow 
ASOC to spend valuable time training for real-world missions.  It would also allow them 
to field the full 26 person team it desires for Phase 2 rather than slowly building its team 
as revenues grow and provide cash flow.  Lastly, the private defense companies would 
provide expertise to ASOC management on running a private defense company.  With 
years of experience in all types of private defense missions, these companies could guide 
ASOC management through the initial learning curve of running an operational private 
SWAT company. 
The weakness of this strategy is that sub-contracting through a private defense 
contractor would lead to a loss of control for ASOC management.  Rather than making 
decisions and executing them, the ASOC leadership would most likely have to clear 
decision-making through its senior management.  If ASOC desired to pursue a different 
strategy or wanted to enter new markets, it would have much less flexibility to act 
quickly and decisively.  Thus, ASOC must seriously consider whether it wants to 
surrender control in return for financial support. 
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5. Focus Solely on Public Sector Law Enforcement 
In addition to niche markets and private defense contractors, ASOC also can 
pursue its original strategy of catering to public sector police departments and federal 
agencies.  This strategy would be the same as discussed throughout this proposal but 
would start smaller and would limit expenses.  Executing this strategy would be the most 
difficult of the strategies discussed because the initial cash flow coming from one police 
department would be minimal – approximately $50,000.  Thus, ASOC would have to be 
very creative in cutting expenses and in acquiring equipment and operating cash if it 
focuses on this strategy.   
In all of these strategies, ASOC will need to find a source of cash to fund its day-
to-day expenses and its necessary purchases of new assets when revenues lag.  An 
understanding of a hierarchy of cash possibilities is necessary for ASOC management to 
continue operations between phases.  A hierarchy of cash possibilities will focus 
management on the least expensive sources of cash and give them additional, more 
expensive sources of cash to address specific operating needs as they arise. 
 
G. HIERARCHY OF CASH POSSIBILITIES (LEAST EXPENSIVE TO 
MOST EXPENSIVE) 
1. Personal Funds 
The first source of cash for ASOC comes from the management’s personal funds.  
This cash is the least expensive for the company because it does not involve borrowing 
money from anyone else.  ASOC will not indebt itself to any person or institution if it 
uses its own personal investment money.  These personal funds can come from personal 
investment accounts, personal savings, and other forms of personal wealth. 
 
2. Friends, Family, Fools 
A second source of cash for ASOC comes from “friends, family, and fools”.  All 
three categories consist of personal wealth that these individuals give to ASOC and 
assume that the company will repay them.  This category of cash is second only to 
personal funds as the least expensive source of cash to ASOC.  Some of this money is 
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legally lent and other portions of it are turned-over to ASOC in confidence of repayment.  
This money is considered social contracting.  Another coined term is “fuzzy debt” 
because sometimes these debts are hard to measure and payment is subjective.67    
 
3. Creative Cash Sources 
The next source of cash, which is more expensive to ASOC than personal funds 
and friends/family/fools, is creative cash sources.  These creative cash sources come from 
numerous sources.  The first is the Small Business Association (SBA) loan.  The SBA 
loan has a more reasonable interest rate than conventional loans because the U.S. 
government guarantees the loans up to 90 percent of the loan itself.  Thus, banks are more 
prone to lend money to small businesses such as ASOC.  These SBA loans are 
administratively intensive, which will require ASOC to request them in advance of 
moving to Phase 2 of its strategy.  SBA also has express loans that have a 36-hour 
approval process for up to $150,000 with a guarantee for a 75 percent bank payback.68  
ASOC could use these express SBA loans for emergency cash flow situations. 
Another creative source of cash is Department of Homeland Security Grants.  
This proposal has discussed these grants at length.  The key to ASOC to secure any of 
this federal grant money is to master the grant process and help potential client law 
enforcement offices and municipalities expedite the paperwork.  ASOC also should focus 
on the political stakeholders and key players in the Department of Homeland Security to 
best determine how it can maximize its legal share of this grant money. 
Additionally, ASOC can explore the possibility of requesting Department of 
Defense Grants for terrorism-related issues.  These grants also will require serious 
administrative and paperwork resources but likely can acquire very low cost cash that 
ASOC can apply directly to operating expenses and asset purchases. 
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Lastly, another source of cash for ASOC is donations from local and regional 
business associations.  Many businesses have vested interests in securing their products 
or services, and ASOC could provide them a valuable reaction-team capability.  LAPD 
SWAT used this method of collecting cash to purchase its command and control van 
from local businesses.69  ASOC could use the same method to receive assistance in 
purchasing assets and covering operating expenses. 
 
4. Home Equity Loan & Leases 
The next more expensive sources of cash for ASOC are home equity loans and 
leases.  Unlike the SBA loans, home equity loans will tend to have a higher interest rate 
and be more costly.  These home equity loans, though, use the owner’s money as equity, 
which introduces more personal risk but also more control of the financing.  Rather than 
making ASOC subject to outside investors, the home equity loan simply gives ASOC 
cash that can be used as they desire. 
Another important source of cash is leases rather than buying equipment or 
facilities.  ASOC plans on using this option from its inception because it dramatically 
lowers short-term costs.  In the long-term, buying is the cheaper option but requires 
capital for the initial purchase.  Thus, for a company that is starting or transitioning to a 
different phase, a lease can save money by lowering start-up costs.  In ASOC’s case, a 
good example of the trade-off between short-term and long-term savings is the difference 
between buying and leasing a helicopter.  If ASOC buys a helicopter, it can cost over 
$2M whereas leasing a helicopter costs approximately $100,000 per year.  Even though 
the price of the lease may be higher in the long-term, a lease allows them to gain this 
necessary asset at a much more reasonable short-term cost.  Thus, both leases and home-
equity loans are attractive to ASOC.   They are still more expensive and risky to the 
company than using personal funds, friend/family money, or various SBA loans, 
government grants, or business association donations, but are another option for ASOC 
management. 
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5. Commercial Sources 
Finally, the most expensive source of cash for ASOC comes from commercial 
sources.  These commercial sources are “angels” (wealthy private investors who mentor 
companies by giving them money) and venture capital companies.  The strength of using 
these commercial resources is that they provide large amounts of liquid cash to the 
company.  The weakness of using these sources is that they are very expensive to ASOC 
in the long-term.  First, the payback is usually substantial.  Venture capital firms make 
their money from the companies they invest in going public or “selling out” to another 
company.  Thus, they can exert serious pressure on a start-up company by pushing them 
to “sell-out” even if they do not want this option.70  
Second, the quest to attract venture capitalist and private investor backing requires 
serious time and administrative commitment.  Venture capital companies hear thousands 
of business plans each year and only accept 5 to 10 businesses per year.71  Thus, ASOC’s 
management would have to invest serious time and energy gaining venture capital 
backing.  This backing would give ASOC start-up flexibility but would also constrain 
them in controlling their strategic direction and pursuing changing visions. 
 
6. Summary of Hierarchy of Cash Possibilities 
This hierarchy of cash possibilities for ASOC illustrates the low and high cost 
sources of cash both in direct financial costs and in opportunity costs.  This cash, though, 
is a necessity for ASOC to make the transition from its consulting and coordination phase 
to its SWAT operational phase.  ASOC can lower the cash needs for this transition by 
determining how it can cut its expenses.  By lowering fixed and variable costs, ASOC 
can smooth this transition between phases and lessen short-term cash flow problems until 
revenues can cover its expenses. 
 




H. DIRECT EXPENSE CUTS 
As discussed in the hierarchy of cash possibilities, a business in transition often 
must make short-term, higher expense decisions in order to stay in business and maintain 
its cash flow.  This same logic applies to ASOC cutting its expenses to survive its 
transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 and Phase 2 to Phase 3.  It may have to choose options 
that will cost more today but keep cash flowing to fund daily operations.  ASOC has 4 
areas where it can focus on strategies for cutting expenses: equipment, facilities, 
personnel, and operating expenses. (See Appendices D & E) 
 
1. Equipment 
ASOC has numerous areas where it can cuts costs in acquiring equipment for the 
operational phase of its business strategy.  Rather than buying all of its equipment, ASOC 
can “co-opt underutilized goods” from others sources.  First, ASOC could borrow 
weapons and equipment from the agencies that are hiring it for services.72   For example, 
local police departments who are transitioning from providing their own SWAT services 
could allow ASOC to use their equipment in exchange for contracted services.  By 
understanding the zone of possible agreement and trading something that costs them 
little, such as their services, for something that is valuable to them, such as equipment, 
they can minimize the start-up costs of purchasing their own equipment. 
Taking this zone of agreement to a deeper level, ASOC also could trade their 
services to police departments for reduced-rate purchases of SWAT equipment that the 
police departments can buy at cheaper prices through various companies that they have 
agreements with for large purchase orders.  This reduced rate buying would cut costs for 
ASOC as they transition from borrowing to buying their equipment. 
Another option for ASOC to acquire equipment is to work endorsement deals 
with various military gear and weapon companies.  Many of these companies desire to 
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have their gear used by various military and SWAT units for marketing purposes.  ASOC 
has the potential to gain a share of this endorsement market and cut equipment costs. 
Rather than initially buying equipment and weapons, the other option for ASOC 
is to require its employees to use their own weapons and equipment.  Numerous police 
departments use this cost-cutting strategy already.  In addition to cutting equipment costs, 
it also allows the employees to tailor their gear to personal taste, which leads to employee 
satisfaction and better performance. 
Still another possibility for ASOC to lower equipment costs is to lease its 
equipment.  This leasing would be more costly in the long-term but would allow ASOC 
to continue its phase transition until it attracts more contracts.  This leasing would give 
ASOC the flexibility to experiment with equipment based on its various mission 
requirements.  It also would allow them to purchase the equipment if it worked 
effectively and met their mission requirements. 
 
2. Facilities 
The facility expenses for ASOC are a substantial piece of the start-up costs as the 
company transitions to operations.  ASOC needs excellent facilities to train for the high-
risk operations it may face during call-outs.  The initial cost to purchase these assets for 
Phase 2 is approximately $1.5M, which will be difficult to obtain before ASOC 
establishes enough contracts to generate sufficient revenue.  Therefore, ASOC must be 
creative in cutting costs for its facility or in finding a substitute until revenues begin to 
flow. 
As discussed for the equipment, a reasonable strategy for gaining temporary 
facilities is to trade the use of facilities for services.  This trading of services can be done 
with local police departments, federal agency offices and training sites, local military 
installations, or with possible niche market facilities such as the Staple Center.   
The local police departments all have facilities that ASOC could use for both 
training and office space.  This trading of space for its services would allow the police 
departments to transition away from their SWAT teams and into contracts with ASOC as 
91 
the police departments and municipal governments finalized any payment for services.  
This trade would be a positive-sum game for both parties involved because they would 
both receive items of value, while giving-up low-cost services.   
The arenas would offer outstanding training facilities for ASOC.  The various 
professional sports stadiums, the Rose Bowl, and The Staple Center would provide 
outstanding, real-world training facilities for ASOC employees to prepare for various 
contingency missions with realistic scenarios.  In turn, ASOC could provide attractive 
returns for these businesses by compensating them with SWAT services.  Again, the key 
to this strategy is for both players to gain something of value by offering a low cost 
service or product. 
All of the niche markets discussed earlier in this chapter – amusement parks, 
ports, nuclear facilities, and federal buildings all could potentially offer excellent facility-
usage both in offices and training facilities to ASOC in return for services.  By 
developing strong social assets with these potential clients, ASOC can develop 
relationships that would benefit it both in word-of-mouth marketing and exchanging 
necessary resources.  By sharing information, gaining and receiving favors, and solving 
and receiving help with problems from clients, ASOC can establish strong professional 




Personnel expenses are the highest operating expenses for ASOC. ($2.3M for 
Phase 2 and $5.7M for Phase 3)  These labor costs are so high because of the number of 
employees needed to effectively provide SWAT services throughout Los Angeles in 
Phase 2 and Southern California in Phase 3.  Hence, personnel costs are the segment that 
ASOC can cut the most during transition times.  There are numerous possibilities to 
decrease these personnel expenses. 
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First, ASOC can start each phase with smaller teams.  Rather than beginning 
Phase 2 with the forecasted 26 employees, it could start with an 8 person team to provide 
services to the niche markets.  For Phase 3, rather than begin with 61 persons, it could use 
the 26 personnel from Phase 2 and slowly begin to build the teams as revenues increase. 
Second, ASOC could ask its employees to work for free for a set period of time.  
For the various phases, this free labor would provide cash for daily operations and 
investment.  ASOC could sell this idea to the employees by offering them shares of the 
company as pay.  This share in the future growth of the company would compensate the 
employees for their services, while instilling ownership in ASOC.  ASOC also could 
recruit retired military special-forces soldiers who have established retirement incomes 
and strong training background and leadership skills for SWAT operations.   
Lastly, another option to save personnel costs would be to pay employees part-
time wages.  This would dramatically cut the personnel costs but would still provide 
income for employees during the company transition to Phase 2.  All of these strategies 
would reduce personnel expenses but also would require the employees to sacrifice a 
steady salary until ASOC can establish stable revenues. 
 
4. Operating Expenses 
The final expenses that ASOC must decrease to survive this worst-case scenario 
are the operating expenses.  The operating expenses are difficult to decrease because the 
company must continue day-to-day operations.  ASOC has options it can pursue to cut 
these costs. 
ASOC’s management can minimize unnecessary expenses.  For example, ASOC 
can minimize amenities for the company.  It can cut unnecessary travel, maintenance, 
supplies, utilities, and training.  Rather than use the helicopter assets for training, it can 
conduct static helicopter training and use it for real-world missions only.  Instead of 
purchasing unnecessary materials, it can forego these purchases and focus the majority of 
operating cash on operational necessities such as ammunition for team members and fuel 
for the vehicles.  The cutting of these expenses can lower the overall expenses of the 
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company by 5 to 10 percent without reducing operational capabilities.  The operating 
expenses are the lifeblood of the day-to-day expenses and must be managed efficiently 
and effectively if ASOC can survive the transition to Phase 2. 
 
I. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASOC 
The focus of this chapter is to determine whether it is worth it financially for the 
company founders to start ASOC SWAT Initiative.  This chapter has analyzed two very 
different scenarios from a financial perspective.  First, it analyzed an optimistic scenario 
to determine if ASOC could make money.  This scenario made the assumption that the 
company could build a substantial client-base before it entered each of the phases.  It 
assumed for Phase 1 that the police departments and federal agencies in Los Angeles 
would want to contract with ASOC to provide communication and coordination services 
for Los Angeles law enforcement.  It assumed for Phase 2 that 50 percent of the local 
SWAT police departments and federal SWAT teams in Los Angeles would want to 
contract with ASOC for SWAT services.  It also assumed for Phase 3 that Las Vegas and 
San Diego would want a contract with ASOC to replace its SWAT services.  Using these 
assumptions to build pro forma income and cash flow projections for a 5-year period, the 
management of ASOC determined that they could make a profit and have a positive cash 
flow without receiving any outside investment. (See Appendices H, I, & J)  Thus, 
according to the optimistic scenario, it is worth it for the developers of ASOC to pursue 
their vision and 3-phase business strategy. 
The financial analysis would not be complete, though, if the managers only 
analyzed the optimistic scenario.  The second scenario conveyed a worst-case scenario 
where only one police department signed a contract for Phase 2, and the other 
departments were slowly signing contracts over a period of time.  Thus, ASOC was 
forced to plan how it would react to the resulting revenue and cash flow problems that 
could threaten its existence as it attempted to transition between phases.  It analyzed the 
strengths and weaknesses of a niche market strategy, a sub-contract with private defense 
firm strategy, and a slow-starting public sector strategy.  It then looked at a hierarchy of 
cash possibilities to fund any cash shortfalls and determined there were numerous, viable 
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options including personal money, loans, grants, donations, leases, and commercial 
possibilities.  Lastly, it analyzed where it could cut expenses in its equipment, facility, 
personnel, and operating expenses until the company began attracting the public law 
enforcement contracts it needs for revenue and cash. 
After analyzing this worst-case strategy, ASOC has determined that it can expect 
to survive the tough transitions between phases by combining the strategies with the 
sources of cash from the hierarchy of cash possibilities and living lean by cutting all 
unnecessary expenses.  By combining all of the analysis from the worst-case scenario, 
ASOC has the potential to continue to grow through its business strategies and weather 
the difficult times when cash is short and revenue is waning.  Because of the identified 
market from Chapter 2 of this business proposal, there is no reason why ASOC cannot 
eventually build its client-base if it develops a quality service that wins the respect of the 
Los Angeles municipal leadership and the Los Angeles people.  Therefore, it is worth it 
for the ASOC leadership to pursue the ASOC SWAT Initiative and its current 3-phase 
business strategy, even if the worst-case scenario proves true. 
The real-question, though, is what scenario will ASOC actually experience as it 
delves into the private SWAT market?  Most likely, it will be a mix of the optimistic 
scenario and the worst-case scenario.  ASOC should be able to attract more than one local 
police department as it transitions to Phase 2.  Conversely, ASOC very likely will not 
begin Phase 2 with 50 percent of Los Angeles police departments and federal agencies 
contracting their SWAT services.  The optimistic scenario does give the ASOC 
management hope, though, that it can make money in a reasonable period of time even if 
it does not corner the private Los Angeles SWAT market if other competitors decide to 
enter.  The niche market strategy also may turn-out to be more lucrative and responsive 
than the public SWAT sector.  The possibilities to make money in this untapped market 
abound and await the taking from managers who can successfully transition when cash is 
short and difficult expense cuts are necessary for financial survival.  ASOC should 
continue with its 3-phase business strategy and adapt this strategy to the resulting 
difficulties it encounters in the Los Angeles SWAT market. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
STUDY 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The ASOC SWAT Initiative business proposal has analyzed numerous variables 
to best forecast where it should focus its entry into the private SWAT market.  Based on 
an in-depth study of the Los Angeles SWAT market, ASOC determined there are 
millions of dollars of potential business for their service.  After a careful study of their 
own internal strengths and weaknesses and the industry’s threats and opportunities, 
ASOC also determined that they have the potential to compete and make a profit in this 
new private SWAT industry.  By analyzing the costs of ASOC versus the costs of the 
numerous SWAT teams located throughout Los Angeles, ASOC determined that it could 
benefit society by providing a more reliable, competent, and focused SWAT service at a 
much lower cost than public law enforcement.  This cost effectiveness analysis reinforced 
their vision of providing a quality service that would contribute to the public good and 
would be a positive-sum opportunity for Los Angeles, San Diego, and Las Vegas.  Lastly, 
ASOC analyzed whether it could survive the tough first years with minimal profit and 
cash flow problems.  It analyzed both an optimistic scenario and a worst-case scenario 
and determined that it could survive and eventually make money with creative financing, 
efficient use of its resources, and effective cost-cutting. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Even with this thorough and realistic business proposal, ASOC still has many 
unanswered concerns and questions concerning its 3-part business strategy.  These 
questions and concerns warrant further research before ASOC launches the various stages 
of its proposed business. 
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1. San Diego and Las Vegas SWAT Market 
The first recommendation for further research is a study of the San Diego and Las 
Vegas SWAT markets.  This business proposal focused heavily on the Los Angeles area 
as it researched the numerous local police department and federal agency SWAT teams.  
It did not focus on the Las Vegas and San Diego SWAT market with the same intensity.  
The analysis looked closely at the Las Vegas and San Diego police department SWAT 
teams to determine their costs and how ASOC could provide them a quality product at a 
fair and reasonable price.  Just as Los Angeles also had numerous other SWAT teams 
other than its primary LAPD SWAT team, these other cities have the same potential 
market.  With more intense study of these markets, ASOC can prepare more effectively 
for Phase 3, the regional SWAT operational phase, with more accurate revenue and 
market forecasts. 
 
2. Niche Markets 
In addition to the regional SWAT market, ASOC also should research the niche 
markets in Los Angeles to determine if these private companies would be a more 
effective market focus for ASOC rather than the public law enforcement market.  This 
proposal briefly addressed the strengths and weaknesses of the niche markets – 
amusement parks, private companies, sport venues, and high-risk terrorist targets such as 
nuclear power plants.  It did not study them enough, though, for company management to 
make educated and informed decisions about the direction ASOC should pursue.   
If ASOC conducted surveys, interviews, and statistical research of the businesses 
in these niche markets, it could better understand the direction it should pursue.  These 
research methods would allow ASOC to determine how much money these companies 




3. Private Security 
To focus additional research on niche markets even more intensely, ASOC could 
also conduct additional research into the private security market.  This market is 
exploding, primarily in the entertainment industry.  The private security market could 
become a very high profit niche for ASOC, especially with their action team focus. 
Many of the celebrities in the movie and music industry desire high profile 
security for special events.  If ASOC understood this market, it would help them make 
smoother transitions between business strategy phases. 
 
4. Regions of the United States 
The final recommendation for further study would be for ASOC to research other 
metropolitan areas and regions in the United States to determine if they would have more 
attractive markets for private SWAT than southern California.  This proposal has focused 
entirely on the Los Angeles - San Diego - Las Vegas triangle because of the proximity to 
the researchers.  Their proximity to this region does not mean that there are not other 
more attractive markets that ASOC could enter more effectively.  Thus, researchers could 
conduct market studies in high density, commercial cities using the same techniques that 
ASOC used.  These techniques include surveys, interviews, police finance department 
budgets, and research into local politics.  This information would allow the ASOC 
management to make informed decisions and efficiently focus their vision and strategies 


























A. RESEARCH AREA 
For the study it was decided to focus on the southern half of California.  The 
specific area focused upon was the Los Angeles Metropolitan and surrounding areas to 
Las Vegas Metropolitan area to San Diego Metropolitan area and everything within that 
triangle (See Figure 4).  The decision to use this area was based upon the current budget 
issues within the state of California and the high threat of a possible terrorist attack(s).   
The southern half of California contains numerous high value targets to include 
the major cites of Los Angeles, Las Vegas and San Diego.  The focal area contains 
numerous international ports of entry to include airports, harbors and a porous land 
border with Mexico. The area also has numerous theme parks and tourist centers that 
could be targeted to inflict mass casualties. 
 
B. DATA 
The method used to collect data was through both interviews and surveys.  The 
interviews were conducted face-to-face and by telephone.  The surveys were selectively 
e-mailed to numerous state and local police departments and law enforcement 
organizations in the target area.  Surveys were also filled out by law enforcement senior 
officials during a seminar that they attended. 
The interviews were primarily used with the large metropolitan area SWAT units 
to gain detailed operational and cost information.  This information and interview 
protocol will be discussed in more detail in the financial portion of this project.  The 
surveys were primarily used with small law enforcement agencies to collect specific 
information that could be consolidated to get an understanding of the average data for 




1. Does your department currently have a SWAT Team? 
2. If not, are you planning on starting a SWAT Team in the future? Why or 
Why not? 
3. Would you be interested in being part of a multi-jurisdictional SWAT 
Team to reduce costs? 
4. If you do have a SWAT Team, what are: 
a. The number of personnel on the Team? 
b. Average number of hours in SWAT training per person, per year? 
c. Number of hours training as a group per year? 
5. What are the scenarios the Team trains for? 
6. What type of scenarios would the Team like to train for? 
7. What other agencies does the Team train with? 
8. Where does the Team do most of its training? 
9. What SWAT assets does the Team have (air assets, vehicle, other)? 
10. What SWAT assets would the Team like to have? 
11. What was the initial cost for setting up the Team? 
12. What are the yearly expenses for the Team per year (to include personnel 
costs)?  Where do the funds come from (State, Federal or Local)? 
13. Could you provide a breakdown of expenses? 
14. What is the average reaction time per callout? 
15. What is the desired reaction time per callout? 
16. What are the number and type of callouts per year? 




Out of 45 surveys sent to these small departments, to include the surveys filled out at 
the seminar, 14 responses were received from departments that had SWAT teams.  Due to 
security concerns and protection of responders, specific details of each responder’s area 
will not be shown.  The following are the average for the responses that were returned. 
 
1. Does your department currently have a SWAT Team? 
 
All of the surveys that were returned were from small departments that currently had 
SWAT Teams. 
 
2. If not, are you planning on starting a SWAT Team in the future? Why or 
Why not? 
 
No responses were returned from departments that did not have SWAT Teams. 
 
3. Would you be interested in being part of a multi-jurisdictional SWAT Team 
to reduce costs? 
 
Five departments responded yes and five departments responded no.  Several 
expressed concerns over how a multi-jurisdictional team would be arranged.  One 
respondent claimed that they are the regional team, but none of the other respondents 
mentioned that there was a regional team. 
 
4. If you do have a SWAT Team, what are: 
 
a. The number of personnel on the Team? 
 
The average number of personnel on a team was 23 with various breakdowns of 
Lieutenants, Sergeants and Police Officers. 
 
b. Average number of hours in SWAT training per person, per 
year? 
 
The average number of hours per person in SWAT training per year was 196 
hours.  Almost half of the respondents’ numbers for personal training were the same as 
question six, the number of hours training as a group per year.  I will make the 
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assumption that there is overlap between the individual training hours and group training 
hours.  But, not calculating overlap, this number calculates out to 3.77 hours of training 
per person per week. 
 
c. Number of hours training as a group per year? 
 
Not calculating overlap with individual training, the average number of hours 
training as a group per year was 174 hours.  This average calculates to 3.35 hours per 
week. 
 
5. What are the scenarios the Team trains for? 
 
The scenario most trained for was hostage rescue with nine departments 
responding as conducting this training.  The following scenarios were also listed:  
methods of entry, eight departments; high risk search warrants, eight departments; sniper 
training, three departments; dignitary protection, two departments; crowd control, two 
departments and surveillance, one department.  Several departments were also beginning 
to train for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenarios. 
 
6. What type of scenarios would the Team like to train for? 
 
Most respondents listed the same scenarios they were already training for.  
Several respondents listed an interest in conducting more hostage rescue and WMD 
scenario training due to recent terrorist events. 
 
7. What other agencies does the Team train with? 
 
Most departments responded as training with adjacent area teams.  At least half 
responded as training with LAPD and LA Sheriff.  Two respondents had done some 
training with the FBI. 
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8. Where does the Team do most of its training? 
 
The majority of teams conduct training locally.  Several take a yearly trip to 
ranges outside of their area, mainly Camp Pendleton and other open air shooting ranges. 
 
9. What SWAT assets does the Team have (air assets, vehicle, other)? 
 
The breakdown of assets were as follows:  air assets, five departments; armored 
vehicles, eight departments; SWAT van, five departments; mobile command centers, 4 
departments; standard vehicles, all departments; robot, one department. 
 
10. What SWAT assets would the Team like to have? 
 
Most departments wanted more of the assets they already had with the majority of 
desired assets being helicopters and armored vehicles. 
 
11. What was the initial cost for setting up the Team? 
 
The initial cost was either not known by the person responding or not included.  
One response of $40,000 was listed. 
 
12. What are the yearly expenses for the Team per year (to include 
personnel costs)?  Where do the funds come from (State, Federal or 
Local)? 
 
Not many respondents listed the cost, but the average yearly expense from those 
who did was $50,000.  The majority of the budgets were from the city budget.  Only 
several respondents were aware that federal grant money for anti-terrorism is available. 
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13. Could you provide a breakdown of expenses? 
 
Respondents did not include a breakdown for the initial survey. 
 
14. What is the average reaction time per callout? 
 
Average time was one hour but the range was from 45 minutes to over 2 hours. 
 
15. What is the desired reaction time per callout? 
 
Average time was under one hour with range from 15 minutes to one hour. 
 
16. What are the number and type of callouts per year? 
 
The average number of callouts were 4 per year with the range from one to 15.  
The majority of these were reported as planned and involved barricaded suspects and 
high risk warrants.   
 
17. Any other comments you think may be relative to the issue? 
 
The majority of respondents did not include additional comments.  Several 
comments listed were:  “No way, no how would my agency even consider a privatized 
SWAT unit” and “Not a bad idea in theory, we tried it (a multi-jurisdictional team) in this 




AVAILABLE LA SWAT MARKET MONEY     
Organization 
Costs / $ 
Available   Local SWAT Cost 
Local SWAT Teams $11,692,035   LAPD SWAT $5,192,035
FBI Enhanced Team $4,500,000   LA County Sheriff $5,000,000
Coast Guard-MSST $1,400,000   Small SWAT Teams $1,500,000
Customs Action Team $1,400,000   Total local SWAT $11,692,035
DEA $4,500,000   *30 SWAT teams from LA, Orange County, and San Bernardino 
ATF Regional Action Team $1,000,000   *Cost to run each SWAT Team = $50,000/year 
Marshal Arrest Response Team $1,000,000     
Homeland Security Grant Money $86,616,404   
Homeland Security Available 
Funds  
TOTAL AVAILABLE $ - LA Area $112,108,439   UASI Grant Program-LA $28,268,504
    UASI Grant Program-Long Beach $12,136,091
 
     UASI Transit Security Program   
    Los Angeles Metrolink $1,982,809
    LA County Metro Transport. Authority $800,000
    HS Grant Program (SHSP) $33,491,000
    HS Grant Program (LETP) $9,938,000
    TOTAL AVAILABLE GRANT FUNDS $86,616,404
    *HS Grant Program available fund assumes that CA  
    designate 25% of funds to LA area.  
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SWAT OVERLAP MARKET      
Organization Cost     
Coast Guard-MSST $1,400,000     
Customs Action Team $1,400,000     
DEA $4,500,000     
ATF Regional Action Team $1,000,000     
Marshal Arrest Response Team $1,000,000     
Small SWAT Teams $1,500,000     
Total SWAT Overlap Funding $10,800,000     
      
 
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      




LA LOCAL SWAT POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
 
1. LA Beverly Hills Police 
2. LA Burbank Police 
3. LA El Monte Police 
4. LA Glendale Police 
5. LA Inglewood Police 
6. LA Long Beach Police 
7. LA Pasadena Police 
8. LA Pomona Police 
9. LA Santa Monica Police 
10. LA Torrance Police 
11. LA West Covina Police 
12. Orange County Sheriff 
13. Orange Anaheim Police 
14. Orange Brea Police 
15. Orange Fullerton Police 
16. Orange Garden Grove Police 
17. Orange Huntington Beach Police 
18. Orange Irvine Police 
19. Orange Newport Beach Police 
20. Orange Police 
21. Orange Santa Ana Police 
22. Orange Westminster Police 
23. Riverside County Sheriff 
24. Riverside Corona Police 
25. Riverside Police 
26. San Bernardino County Sheriff 
27. San Bernardino Fontana Police 
28. San Bernardino Ontario Police 
29. San Bernardino Rialto Police 
30. San Bernardino Police 
31. LA Police  
32. LA County Sheriff 
 
*Source: Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 2000: Data for 




























PHASE 2     
ASOC BUDGET    SWAT BUDGET    
         
         
SUPPLIES/SERVICES $825,170  INITIAL STARTUP CAPITAL REQUESTS   
CAPITAL $70,000      
SALARIES $2,336,474  1 UPARMORED SUBURBANS $100,000
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS $3,231,644  2 REGULAR SUBURBANS $100,000
     3 300 WINMAG SNIPER RIFLES  $1,400
     OPTICS (SCOPES/BINOS/IR/NVGS) $100,000
AUTH POSITIONS    UNIFORMS/LBGS $10,000
COMMISSIONED 25  BODY ARMOR $40,000
CIVILIAN 1  BREACHING EQUIPMENT $40,000
     
CLIMBING EQUIPMENT 
(ROPES/LADDERS) $30,000
TOTAL 26  ASSAULT RIFLES (9MM) (25) $22,500
     ASSAULT PISTOL (45) (25) $11,250
SUPPLIES/SERVICES REQUESTS    ASSAULT RIFLES (556) (10) $4,500
OFFICE SUPPLIES $5,000  COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT $100,000
GROCERIES $2,500  MISCELLANEOUS $50,000
OPERATING SUPPLIES $50,000      
SMALL EQUIPMENT $25,000  FACILITIES (OFFICE/TRNG) $1,500,000
MAINT-VEHICLES $50,000      
HELOS (1) LEASED $100,000  TOTAL $2,109,650
MAINT-HELO ($582/hr. * 500hrs.* 1 
helo) $291,045    
FUEL (113 gal/hr * $2.25/gal * 500 
hours) $127,125  CAPITAL COSTS   
RENTAL  $15,000  Replacement Vehicles (.5 vehicles/year) $50,000
DATA PROCESSING $0  Equipment $20,000
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TELEPHONE $10,000  TOTAL $70,000
UTILITIES $15,000  REFERENCES:  
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES $5,000  http://www.colt.com/law/m4commando.asp  
ATTORNEY FEES $5,000  http://www.blackhawkindustries.com/  
PSYCHIATRIST $0  http://www.daksindustries.com/pages/930104/index.htm 
MEDICAL SERVICES/SUPPLIES $3,500    
MAINT-FACITILIES $10,000    
MAINT-EQUIPMENT $10,000    
POSTAGE $100    
CONVENTIONS/SEMINARS $5,000    
EDUCATION/TRAINING $20,000    
TRAVEL/TRANSPORTATION $25,000    
PRINTING/REPRODUCTION $400    
DUES/SUBSCRIPTIONS $500    
FEES/LICENSES $10,000    
AMMUNITION (TRAINING) $40,000    
TOTAL SUPPLIES/SERVICES  $825,170  NOTES  
   Salaries based on LA salaries +10%.  
POSITIONS FY04-05   SALARIES  
POLICE OFFICER LT 1  LT $118,338
POLICE OFFICER SGT 3  SGT $100,449
POLICE OFFICERS 21  OFFICER $87,573
1 ADMIN 1  ADMIN $77,756




PHASE 3     
ASOC BUDGET    SWAT BUDGET    
         
         
SUPPLIES/SERVICES $1,996,510  INITIAL STARTUP CAPITAL REQUESTS   
CAPITAL $170,000      
SALARIES $5,686,964  4 UPARMORED SUBURBANS $400,000
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS $7,853,474  4 REGULAR SUBURBANS $200,000
     12 300 WINMAG SNIPER RIFLES  $5,600
     OPTICS (SCOPES/BINOS/IR/NVGS) $500,000
AUTH POSITIONS    UNIFORMS/LBGS $25,000
COMMISSIONED 60  BODY ARMOR $100,000
CIVILIAN 1  BREACHING EQUIPMENT $75,000
     CLIMBING EQUIPMENT (ROPES/LADDERS) $75,000
TOTAL 61  ASSAULT RIFLES (9MM) (50) $45,000
     ASSAULT PISTOL (45) (50) $22,500
SUPPLIES/SERVICES REQUESTS    ASSAULT RIFLES (556) (10) $4,500
OFFICE SUPPLIES $5,000  COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT $750,000
GROCERIES $2,500  MISCELLANEOUS $50,000
OPERATING SUPPLIES $50,000      
SMALL EQUIPMENT $25,000  FACILITIES (OFFICE/TRNG) $2,500,000
MAINT-VEHICLES $50,000      
HELOS (3) LEASED $300,000  TOTAL $4,752,600
MAINT-HELO ($582/hr. * 500hrs.* 3 
helos) $873,135    
FUEL(113 gal/hr*$2.25/gal*3 helos*500 
hr) $381,375  CAPITAL COSTS   
RENTAL  $25,000  Replacement Vehicles (2 vehicles/year) $150,000
DATA PROCESSING $0  Equipment $20,000
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TELEPHONE $20,000  TOTAL $170,000
UTILITIES $30,000    
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES $5,000  REFERENCES:  
ATTORNEY FEES $5,000  http://www.colt.com/law/m4commando.asp  
PSYCHIATRIST $0  http://www.blackhawkindustries.com/  
MEDICAL SERVICES/SUPPLIES $3,500  http://www.daksindustries.com/pages/930104/index.htm 
MAINT-FACITILIES $25,000    
MAINT-EQUIPMENT $20,000    
POSTAGE $100    
CONVENTIONS/SEMINARS $20,000    
EDUCATION/TRAINING $20,000    
TRAVEL/TRANSPORTATION $50,000    
PRINTING/REPRODUCTION $400    
DUES/SUBSCRIPTIONS $500    
FEES/LICENSES $10,000    
AMMUNITION (TRAINING) $75,000    
TOTAL SUPPLIES/SERVICES  $1,996,510  NOTES  
   (salaries based on LA salaries +10%)  
POSITIONS FY04-05   SALARIES  
4 POLICE OFFICER LT 4  LT $118,338
18 POLICE OFFICER SGT 18  SGT $100,449
38 POLICE OFFICERS 38  OFFICER $87,573
1 ADMIN 1  ADMIN $77,756




SWAT COSTS FOR LA, SAN DIEGO, & LAS VEGAS      
       
Las Vegas Fiscal Cost Analysis       
  2002 2003 2004    
Total Cost (unadjusted) $4,478,719 $5,166,384 $4,964,371    
Total Cost (2004 $) $4,583,228 $5,226,314 $4,964,371    
Las Vegas Average Total Cost $4,924,638 (See Las Vegas SWAT Appendix)   
       
Los Angeles Fiscal Cost Analysis       
Personnel Costs       
Rank Salary 
# 
Personnel Costs    
LT $107,580 1 $107,580    
SGTs $91,317 5 $456,585    
Officers $70,687 60 $4,241,220    
Total Personnel Costs $4,805,385      
  LA SWAT Assumptions    
Supply/Service Requests 2004 1.  Not including sunk costs (initial buying of vehicles) 
Expense Fund - Equipment $28,300 2.  Maintenance on vehicles - ave. of Las Vegas X 2 
Range Fees $21,210 (because LA SWAT twice as big)   
Maint. - Vehicles $57,140 3.  Vehicle Replacement - vehicle life of 5 years, thus  
Vehicle Replacement $280,000 replace 7 of the 37 police cars each year.  
Total Supply/Service Costs $386,650 4.  Conservative Costs for LA because much of the  
Los Angeles Total Cost  $5,192,035 budget is buried in the Metropolitan Division Money 
(based on 2004)       
       
San Diego Fiscal Cost Analysis       
San Diego Total SWAT Cost $2,230,590 San Diego SWAT Assumption   
(based on 2005 proposed)  1.  SD PD Proposed 2005 Budget = $309,804,119 
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Total Large City SWAT Costs $12,347,262 2.  SWAT receives approximately .72%  
       
Small City SWAT       
# of small SWAT teams in Triangle 30      
Average Annual Cost per team $50,000 Small City SWAT Assumptions   
Total Small City SWAT Costs $1,500,000 1.  The ave. cost-small city SWAT team = $50,000. 
  (this is an average of the numbers from the surveys) 




SWAT BUDGET 2002-2003   
    
    
SUPPLIES/SERVICES $540,587
CAPITAL $286,996
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS* (SEE NOTE 
1) $4,478,719
TOTAL LVMPD BUDGET $319,284,454
% SWAT RECEIVES 1.40%
    
AUTH POSITIONS   
COMMISSIONED 31
CIVILIAN 1
    
CAPITAL REQUESTS   
4 REPLACEMENT COMPUTER $4,896 
10 LASH HEADSETS $6,000 
2 SNIPER RIFLES $5,000 
15 TACT EAR PROTECTORS $7,500 
2 BALLISTIC SHIELDS $2,200 
11 REPLACEMENT VEHICLES $261,400 
TOTAL $286,996 
    
SUPPLIES/SERVICES REQUESTS   
OFFICE SUPPLIES $3,400 
GROCERIES $1,400 
OPERATING SUPPLIES $50,000 




RENTAL  $215,292 
DATA PROCESSING $0 
TELEPHONE $19,723 
UTILITIES $30,000 
LIABILITY INSURANCE $49,931 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES $1,600 
ATTORNEY FEES $0 
PSYCHIATRIST $0 













*NOTE 1:    
INCLUDES SALARY/BENEFITS   
IN DIRECT COST TOTALS  
  
**NOTE 2  
BREAK OUT OF POSTIONS FY04-05  
1 POLICE OFFICER LT  
3 POLICE OFFICER SGT  
26 POLICE OFFICERS  




SWAT BUDGET 2003-2004   
    
    
SUPPLIES/SERVICES $552,070
CAPITAL $550,440
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS* (SEE NOTE 1) $5,166,384
TOTAL LVMPD BUDGET $351,834,736
% SWAT RECEIVES 1.47%
    
AUTH POSITIONS   
COMMISSIONED 31
CIVILIAN 1
    
CAPITAL REQUESTS   
19 REPLACEMENT VEHICLES $534,545
3 REPLACEMENT SNIPER RIFLES $12,000
1 REPLACEMENT LAPTOP 
COMPUTER/MONITOR $3,895
    
    
    
TOTAL $550,440
    































SWAT BUDGET 2004-2005   
    
    
SUPPLIES/SERVICES $711,888
CAPITAL $60,000
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS* (SEE NOTE 1) $4,964,371
TOTAL LVMPD BUDGET $383,029,114
% SWAT RECEIVES 1.30%
    
AUTH POSITIONS** (SEE NOTE 2)   
COMMISSIONED 31
CIVILIAN 1
    
CAPITAL REQUESTS   
1 REPLACEMENT VEHICLE $45,000
1 THROW PHONE $15,000
    
    
    
    
TOTAL $60,000
    


































INCOME STATEMENT - ASOC SWAT 
INITIATIVE 
PHASE 
1        
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5    
Sales Revenue $460,000 $473,800 $488,014 $502,654 $517,734 PD-30*$10,000, Fed-6*20,000 
Less Expenses           
LAPD,Sheriff-2*20,000(3% 
growth/yr.) 
Payments on Equipment $65,949 $65,949 $65,949 $65,949 $65,949
($250,000 loan, 5 yrs, 10%, 
equipment) 
Payments on Facilities $36,000 $37,080 $38,192 $39,338 $40,518
($3000 office rent)(3% 
inc./yr.) 
Capital Expenses $20,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 (Initial office supplies) 
Personnel Expenses $300,000 $309,000 $318,270 $327,818 $337,653 (3% increase)  
Supply/Services Expenses $0 $0 $0 $0 $0    
Depreciation Expenses $0 $0 $0 $0 $0    
Total Expenses $421,949 $412,029 $422,411 $433,105 $444,120    
Income before Income Taxes (federal & state) $38,051 $61,771 $65,603 $69,549 $73,614    
Income Taxes (34% federal, 8.84% state) $16,301 $26,463 $28,104 $29,795 $31,536    
Net Income (Loss) $21,750 $35,308 $37,498 $39,754 $42,078    
PROFIT MARGIN 4.7% 7.5% 7.7% 7.9% 8.1%    
         
ASSUMPTIONS         
Sales Revenue - Police Dpts. = 30*$10,000.  Fed Agencies = 6*$20,000.   LAPD, Sheriff Dept. SWAT=2*$20,000   
3% growth per year         
Payments on Equipment  - $250,000 loan for 5 yrs. at 10% interest       
Payment on Facilities - $3000 per month office rent.  3% increase per year.      
Capital Expenses - 1st year initial office supply purchases        




CASH FLOW-ASOC SWAT INITIATIVE 
PHASE 
1      
       
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5  
Beginning Cash Balance $0 $21,750 $57,058 $94,557 $134,311  
             
Cash Flow from Operating Activities            
Earnings $460,000 $473,800 $488,014 $502,654 $517,734  
Operating Expenses (all expenses - 
payments) $320,000 $309,000 $318,270 $327,818 $337,653  
Income Taxes $16,301 $26,463 $28,104 $29,795 $31,536  
Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities $123,699 $138,337 $141,640 $145,041 $148,545  
Cash Flow from Investing Activities            
Payments on Equipment $65,949 $65,949 $65,949 $65,949 $65,949  
Payments on Facilities $36,000 $37,080 $38,192 $39,338 $40,518  




$105,287 -$106,467  
Net Change in Cash $21,750 $35,308 $37,499 $39,754 $42,078  
Beginning Cash Balance $0 $21,750 $57,058 $94,557 $134,311  
Ending Cash Balance $21,750 $57,058 $94,557 $134,311 $176,389  
       
ASSUMPTIONS       
No financing activities because ASOC is a private 
company      
Includes start-up costs       
Earnings = Revenues from income statement.      
Operating expenses = salaries + initial furniture costs for 1st year and salaries for years following.  3% inc. per year. 
Salaries = 3* $100,000 w/ 3% inc./yr.       
Taxes = 42.84% (include state and federal taxes      
Payments on Equipment = Loan for $250,000 communication equipment.  Includes 3% increase per year for rent. 
Payments on facilities = $3000/month office rent      
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APPENDIX I 
INCOME STATEMENT - ASOC  - 
PHASE 2     
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Sales Revenue $5,250,000 $5,407,500 $5,569,725 $5,736,817 $5,908,921
Less Expenses           
Payments on Equipment $106,824 $106,824 $106,824 $106,824 $106,824
Payments on Facilities $206,223 $206,223 $206,223 $206,223 $206,223
Capital Expenses $70,000 $72,100 $74,263 $76,491 $78,786
Personnel Expenses $2,336,474 $2,406,568 $2,478,765 $2,553,128 $2,629,722
Supply/Services Expenses $825,170 $849,925 $875,423 $901,686 $928,736
Depreciation Expenses 106,930 106,930 106,930 106,930 106,930
Total Expenses $3,651,621 $3,748,570 $3,848,428 $3,951,282 $4,057,221
Income before Income Taxes  $1,598,379 $1,658,930 $1,721,297 $1,785,535 $1,851,700
Income Taxes $684,746 $710,685 $737,404 $764,923 $793,268
Net Income (Loss) $913,633 $948,244 $983,893 $1,020,612 $1,058,432
PROFIT MARGIN 17.4% 17.5% 17.7% 17.8% 17.9%
      
ASSUMPTIONS      
Sales Revenue - 50% of cities = $50,000/city*15=$750,000.  50% of Fed Agencies=$4.5M 
3% increase in revenues per year     
Payments on Equipment - 5 year loan at 10% interest.     
Payment on Facilities - 10 year loan at 6.25% interest.   
Personnel Expenses - 3% increase per year.    
Supply/Services Expenses - 3% increase per year.    
Depreciation Expenses - Facility - $1M salvage value, 20 year useful life.    
Depreciation Expenses - Equipment - $200,000 salvage value, 5 year useful life. 
Income Taxes - 34% federal, 8.84% 
state     
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CASH FLOW - ASOC - PHASE 2      
      
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Beginning Cash Balance $0 $1,020,563 $2,075,738 $3,166,561 $4,294,103
            
Cash Flow from Operating Activities           
Earnings $5,250,000 $5,407,500 $5,569,725 $5,736,817 $5,908,921
Operating Expenses (all expenses - 
payments) $3,231,644 $3,328,593 $3,428,451 $3,531,305 $3,637,244
Taxes $684,746 $710,685 $737,404 $764,923 $793,268
Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities $1,333,610 $1,368,222 $1,403,870 $1,440,589 $1,478,409
Cash Flow from Investing Activities           
Payments on Equipment $106,824 $106,824 $106,824 $106,824 $106,824
Payments on Facilities $206,223 $206,223 $206,223 $206,223 $206,223
Net Cash Flow from Investing Activities -$313,047 -$313,047 -$313,047 -$313,047 -$313,047
Net Change in Cash $1,020,563 $1,055,175 $1,090,823 $1,127,542 $1,165,362
Beginning Cash Balance $0 $1,020,563 $2,075,738 $3,166,561 $4,294,103
Ending Cash Balance $1,020,563 $2,075,738 $3,166,561 $4,294,103 $5,459,465
      
ASSUMPTIONS      
No financing activities because ASOC is a private 
company     
Includes start-up costs      
Earnings = Revenues from income statement.     
Operating expenses = All expenses except for payments on equipment and facilities.  3% inc. per year. 
Taxes = 42.84% (include state and federal taxes     
Payments on Equipment = Payments same as income statement.    




INCOME STATEMENT - ASOC - PHASE 3      
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Sales Revenue $12,405,228 $12,777,385 $13,160,706 $13,555,528 $13,962,193
Less Expenses           
Payments on Equipment $594,230 $594,230 $594,230 $594,230 $594,230
Payments on Facilities $343,704 $343,704 $343,704 $343,704 $343,704
Capital Expenses $170,000 $175,100 $180,353 $185,764 $191,336
Personnel Expenses $5,686,964 $5,857,573 $6,033,300 $6,214,299 $6,400,728
Supply/Services Expenses $1,996,510 $2,056,405 $2,118,097 $2,181,640 $2,247,090
Depreciation Expenses 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000
Total Expenses $9,291,408 $9,527,012 $9,769,685 $10,019,637 $10,277,088
Income before Income Taxes (federal & 
state) $3,113,820 $3,250,373 $3,391,022 $3,535,890 $3,685,105
Income Taxes (34% federal, 8.84% state) $1,333,960 $1,392,460 $1,452,714 $1,514,775 $1,578,699
Net Income (Loss) $1,779,860 $1,857,913 $1,938,308 $2,021,115 $2,106,406
PROFIT MARGIN 14.3% 14.5% 14.7% 14.9% 15.1%
      
ASSUMPTIONS      
Sales Revenue - Phase 2 Revenue plus Las Vegas and San Diego SWAT contracts.  
3% increase in revenues per year      
Payments on Equipment - 5 year loan at 10% interest.      
Payment on Facilities - 10 year loan at 6.25% interest.     
Personnel Expenses - 3% increase per year.     
Supply/Services Expenses - 3% increase per year.     
Depreciation Expenses - Facility - $1.5M salvage value, 20 year useful life.     
Depreciation Expenses - Equipment - $500,000 salvage value, 5 year useful life.  
Income Taxes - 34% federal, 8.84% state      
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CASH FLOW - ASOC - PHASE 3      
      
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Beginning Cash Balance $0 $2,279,860 $4,637,773 $7,076,080 $9,597,196
            
Cash Flow from Operating Activities           
Earnings $12,405,228 $12,777,385 $13,160,706 $13,555,528 $13,962,193
Operating Expenses (all expenses - 
payments) $7,853,474 $8,089,078 $8,331,751 $8,581,703 $8,839,154
Taxes (34% fed., 8.84% state) $1,333,960 $1,392,460 $1,452,714 $1,514,775 $1,578,699
Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities $3,217,794 $3,295,847 $3,376,242 $3,459,049 $3,544,340
Cash Flow from Investing Activities           
Payments on Equipment $594,230 $594,230 $594,230 $594,230 $594,230
Payments on Facilities $343,704 $343,704 $343,704 $343,704 $343,704
Net Cash Flow from Investing Activities -$937,934 -$937,934 -$937,934 -$937,934 -$937,934
Net Change in Cash $2,279,860 $2,357,913 $2,438,308 $2,521,115 $2,606,406
Beginning Cash Balance $0 $2,279,860 $4,637,773 $7,076,080 $9,597,196
Ending Cash Balance $2,279,860 $4,637,773 $7,076,080 $9,597,196 $12,203,602
      
ASSUMPTIONS      
No financing activities because ASOC is a private company     
Includes start-up costs      
Earnings = Revenues from income statement.     
Operating expenses = All expenses except for payments on equipment and facilities.  3% inc. per year. 
Taxes = 42.84% (include state and federal taxes     
Payments on Equipment = Payments same as income statement.    
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